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THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA POLICY DEBATE
REDUX: SEPARATING RHETORIC FROM REALITY
LINDA J. ALLEN, PHD*
INTRODUCTION
At times, it seems like the debate over the environmental reper-
cussions of the North American Free Trade Agreement1 (“NAFTA”) has
never ended.2 Twenty-five years ago, in response to environmentalists’ dire
predictions of industry flight, pollution havens, and a race to the bottom for
domestic environmental standards under the trade agreement, the United
States, Mexico, and Canada negotiated ground-breaking environmental
policies in NAFTA and an associated environmental side agreement, North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation3 (“NAAEC”), to ad-
dress the potential environmental impacts associated with trade liberal-
ization in North America.4 The integration of environmental issues into
NAFTA was considered a watershed event as it represented the first time
policymakers explicitly sought to address the complex linkages between
environmental protection and liberalized trade. At that time, NAFTA
was touted as the “greenest” trade agreement ever and its policy frame-
work was presented as a model for all future trade agreements.5
* School of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math, American Public University
System, Charles Town, WV, 25414, United States.
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2 This Article focuses on the debate over the environmental effects of NAFTA, but the
debate over the free trade agreement itself likewise persists. Without a doubt, NAFTA
was a controversial trade agreement at its inception. Although most of this continuing
controversy is related to its impacts on jobs in the United States, its environmental
effects are frequently cited as one of its major shortcomings. See infra note 4.
3 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
4 See generally PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996); JOHN
J. AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND GLOBAL TRADE, NAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLITICS (1997); FREDERICK MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA, THE SCIENCE AND
ART OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1998); BARBARA HOGENBOOM, MEXICO AND THE NAFTA
ENVIRONMENT DEBATE (1998).
5 See, e.g., AUDLEY, supra note 4, at 126.
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And yet concerns over the adequacy of NAFTA policies to protect
the environment have repeatedly surfaced over the intervening years with
accompanying calls to renegotiate or strengthen the environmental provi-
sions.6 The Obama administration raised concerns about the environmental
provisions but declined to reopen NAFTA;7 it subsequently strengthened
some aspects of the agreement indirectly within the context of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership8 (“TPP”) by adding new policies related to conservation
of international fisheries, as well as commitments to implement obligations
under certain multilateral environmental agreements.9 More recently,
6 See, e.g., John H. Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 392 (2010) [hereinafter Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the
NAFTA Environmental Regime]; Jeffrey Kucik, Strengthen labor, environmental rules
to improve NAFTA, THE HILL (Jan. 31, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy
-environment/317180-strengthen-labor-environmental-rules-to-improve-nafta [https://
perma.cc/MN9Q-3CPS]. John Audley & Scott Vaughan, Time for the NAFTA Environ-
mental Watchdog to Get Some Teeth, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Jun. 24,
2003), http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/06/24/time-for-nafta-environmental-watchdog
-to-get-some-teeth-pub-1300; Randy Christensen & Albert Koehl, NAFTA needs envi-
ronmental credibility, WINDSOR STAR (Mar. 8, 2008), § A6; Helmut Mach, Rethinking
trade with our largest partner, EDMONTON J. (Dec. 10, 2008), § A19.
7 Mach, supra note 6; Brian Knowlton, Obama doesn’t plan to reopen NAFTA talks, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/21/business/21nafta.html?_r=1
[https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/21/business/21nafta
.html?_r=1].
8 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 20.1-.5, Feb. 4, 2016, U.S.T.R., https://
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma
.cc/ZB65-VWUJ] [hereinafter TPP] (a free trade agreement encompassing twelve Pacific-
rim countries including the United States, initiated under the George W. Bush adminis-
tration, and concluded under the Obama administration. The Trump administration
decided that it would not seek approval of the trade agreement from the U.S. Congress.
TPP includes all three NAFTA countries, thus provisions in TPP serve to augment those
in NAFTA).
9 Rohan Patel, Special Assistant to the President, What Environmental and Conservation
Advocates Are Saying About TPP’s Environment Chapter, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 6,
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/11/04/what-environmental-and
-conservation-advocates-are-saying-about-tpps-environment [https://perma.cc/A4ES-NEE4].
The environment chapter of TPP included a general commitment to implement multi-
lateral environmental agreements to which each trading partner was a party, as well as
specific commitments to fulfill obligations under the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora. Additionally, the TPP environment chapter included commit-
ments to improve management of marine wild fisheries and conservation of other marine
species, such as turtles and sharks, and most importantly, the elimination of certain
subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. See TPP, supra note 8.
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the Trump administration took a much stronger position on NAFTA overall
and threatened to abrogate the trade agreement entirely but subsequently
agreed to renegotiate it.10 Towards that end, the Trump administration
has identified specific renegotiation objectives for the environmental
provisions that seek to redress the perceived weaknesses of the existing
NAFTA policy framework.11 Undoubtedly, the NAFTA environmental poli-
cies have been and continue to be a source of contention.
What is the source of the NAFTA trade and environmental policy
debate redux? Critics of NAFTA and NAAEC have long argued that the
environmental policy framework is inadequate for addressing the trade-
related environmental impacts of NAFTA and falls far short of the orig-
inal expectations of the environmentalists. For example, critics claim that
the mechanisms created under the trade agreement to ensure effective
enforcement of domestic environmental regulations are toothless,12 the
integration of the trade and environment has never occurred,13 some of
NAFTA’s provisions have had unintended adverse consequences that
undermine environmental protection,14 and new environmental concerns
10 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Sends Nafta Renegotiation Notice to Congress, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/us/politics/nafta-renegotiation-trump
.html?mcubz=0 [https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/us/poli
tics/nafta-renegotiation-trump.html?mcubz=0].
11 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Summary of Objectives for
NAFTA Renegotiation (July 17, 2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Re
leases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6A5-AZG9]; see, e.g., NAFTA Renegotiation
Should Start with May 10 Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 12, 2017) (detailing reac-
tions of environmentalists and Congressional leaders to renegotiation); see Environmental
Groups Back Eight ‘Essential’ Changes to NAFTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Apr. 7, 2017).
12 See, e.g., Geoff Garver, Tooth Decay, 25 ENVTL. FORUM 34, 34–38 (2008) (in reference
to the state-to-state dispute resolution process, Garver states “NAFTA’s environmental
teeth are in real danger of rotting away, with little potential to address the important envi-
ronmental concerns that ensue from globalization.”); see also Tracy D. Hester, Designed
for Distrust: Revitalizing NAFTA’s Environmental Submissions Process, 28 GEO. ENVTL.
L. REV. 29, 29–33 (2015); Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement
Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future
Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 31–32 (1995); GARY HUFBAUER ET AL., INST. FOR INT’L ECON.,
NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SEVEN YEARS LATER (Oct. 2000).
13 See, e.g., Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note
6, at 392. Knox concludes that with respect to the performance of the NAFTA environ-
mental regime, “As an attempt to solve ‘trade-and-environment’ problems, it is undoubtedly
a failure. From that perspective, it either addresses baseless concerns or is ineffective.”
14 See, e.g., Christine Chiu, Chapter 11 and the Environment, 33 ENVTL. POL. & L. 71, 73
(2003) (“Although the Objective of Chapter 11 is to ensure that countries do not favor do-
mestic investors over foreign investors, essentially it ends up having the opposite effect.
Except in rare instances, none of the party nations provide compensation to domestic
companies that incur losses as a result of government regulations.”).
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have emerged that are not adequately addressed.15 Although NAFTA and
NAAEC included some of the most far-reaching environmental policies
ever included in a trade agreement, the current view is that these poli-
cies must be substantially revised and augmented.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric in favor of renegotiation of NAFTA
environmental provisions, it is not clear that the proposed revisions or
additions are truly warranted. Moreover, opening the environmental
policies would send a strong yet contradictory message that the corre-
sponding policies in other U.S. free trade agreements, which are largely
modeled after NAFTA,16 are also inadequate, even though similar calls
for renegotiation of environmental provisions of the other agreements
have not been made. Lastly, renegotiation of the NAFTA environmental
policies may provide an opportunity to merely weaken the environmental
provisions or at best provide some cosmetic window dressing with no sub-
stantive changes, which in both cases will further perpetuate the illusion
that the environmental protection provisions are essential for liberalizing
trade even if the provisions are ineffective.
This Article provides a critical review of the rhetoric that has forced
the environmental concerns related to NAFTA back onto the domestic
policy agenda and how the rhetoric matches the reality for addressing
the environmental consequences of the trade agreement. This Article ar-
gues that there is a notable disconnect between the rhetoric and reality,
and any revisions to NAFTA environmental policies should be informed
by the reality. The Article is organized as follows; Part I provides back-
ground on the environmental impacts associated with NAFTA, Part II
provides an overview of the NAFTA’s and NAAEC’s environmental policies
intended to address the impacts, Part III discusses the perceived short-
comings of the policies and the justification for policy changes based on
15 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & James Salzman, Rethinking NAFTA: Deepening the Commit-
ment to Sustainable Development 125, 126, in PIIE BRIEFING: 17-2 A PATH FORWARD FOR
NAFTA (C. Fred Bergsten & Monica de Bolle, eds., 2017) (“The environmental elements
that negotiators first incorporated in NAFTA 25 years ago have stood up surprisingly
well, although weaknesses have emerged and other issues and priorities have come to the
fore.”); see also Linda J. Allen, Trade and Environment: A New Direction for Green Trade,
15 THE ESTEY CENTRE J. OF INT’L L. & TRADE POL. 47, 48 (2014), https://ideas.repec.org/s
/ags/ecjilt.html [https://perma.cc/WS99-ABLA] (“For NAFTA, the priorities were addressing
a broad range of hypothetical environmental effects of trade liberalization such as industry
flight, pollution havens, downward harmonization, . . . . By contrast, for more recent trade
agreements, environmentalists have focused on a narrower set of tangible environmental
policy concerns that may not be linked directly to trade liberalization but rather are
environmental issues that need urgent attention from the international community.”).
16 See generally Allen, supra note 15.
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existing research, Part IV examines the Trump administration renegotia-
tion objectives for the NAFTA environmental policies, and the Conclusions
summarize the recommendations for moving forward.
I. THE NAFTA AND ENVIRONMENT DEBATE
Almost from the moment that the United States and Mexico an-
nounced their intent to negotiate a free trade agreement, environmental
groups in the United States raised concerns over the potential environ-
mental impacts of trade liberalization in North America.17 Most of the
concerns stemmed from the fact that the trade liberalization was occur-
ring between two highly developed countries with high levels of enforce-
ment of environmental regulations and a developing country with weak
17 See SUSAN FLETCHER & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB92006, ENVIRON-
MENT AND TRADE (1992) (detailing how the United States and Mexico formally announced
their intent to negotiate a free trade agreement in June 1990, Canada joined the nego-
tiations in February 1991, and NAFTA, which encompasses all three countries, was
finalized in August 1992); Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 4, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 281, 289 [hereinafter CUSFTA]. See, e.g., STEVEN SHRYBMAN, SELLING CANADA’S
ENVIRONMENT SHORT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CASE AGAINST THE TRADE DEAL 19 (1988);
MICHELLE SWENARCHUK, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 2 (1988); Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
opened for signature on Jan. 1, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT] (indicating that NAFTA was not the first trade agreement to raise environmental
concerns, but it was the first to explicitly address them. Environmentalists identified
environmental concerns during negotiations of the CUSFTA and GATT in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, but these concerns never gained traction). See, e.g., Mark Ritchie, GATT,
Agriculture, and the Environment: The U.S. Double Zero Plan, 20 ECOLOGIST 214 (1990);
JANINE FERRETTI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2 (Can. Envtl.
Law Assoc., Issue Paper, Oct. 1991); Charles Arden-Clarke, The general agreement on
tariffs and trade, environmental protection and sustainable development (World Wildlife
Fund 1991). See generally NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, Environmental Concerns Related to a
United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement 631–43, NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT
(Daniel Magraw ed., 1995); The North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing before the
H. Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 64–66 (1991) (statement of Stewart
Hudson) [hereinafter Statement of Stewart Hudson]; North American Free Trade Agreement:
Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitive-
ness of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 113–33 (1991) (statement of
Richard Kamp) [hereinafter Statement of Richard Kamp] (addressing initial concerns
about NAFTA). See SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON, TAKING TRADE TO THE STREETS: THE LOST
HISTORY OF PUBLIC EFFORTS TO SHAPE GLOBALIZATION (2001) (discussing comprehen-
sively the history of environmental, labor, and other social concerns within the trade
policy domain).
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levels of enforcement of comparable regulations.18 Environmentalists
argued that this disparity in levels of enforcement would worsen environ-
mental protection in all three countries.19 Due to the strength of the envi-
ronmental lobby in the United States and the salience of the issues raised
at that particular time, the environmentalists were able to leverage their
political relationships with key U.S. legislators to ensure that environmen-
tal issues were considered during the trade agreement negotiations.20 By
the time NAFTA was submitted for legislative approval in 1993, the reso-
lution of environmental concerns had become a political imperative re-
quired for ultimate passage of the trade agreement.21
The principal environmental concern identified for NAFTA was
the potential for liberalized trade to give rise to “pollution havens” in
Mexico as dirty industries relocated to take advantage of lax enforcement
of environmental laws in that country, with possible pollution spillovers
along the U.S.-Mexico border.22 Rapid industrialization along this border
prior to NAFTA had resulted in considerable environmental degradation
and these dire conditions served as a harbinger for what might occur
elsewhere in Mexico as trade and investment were further liberalized.23
Although pollution havens were the initial concern for NAFTA, environ-
mental groups subsequently raised several other concerns, including the
potential use of trade regime rules to challenge legitimate domestic envi-
ronmental regulations and standards as non-tariff barriers to trade,24 
18 M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42965, THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) (2017); see also JOHNSON & BEAULIEU,
supra note 4, at 12, 20.
19 See, e.g., HOGENBOOM, supra note 4; JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 4, at 17–19.
20 See, e.g., AUDLEY, supra note 4, at 65, 69.; MAYER, supra note 4, at 94, 98; HOGENBOOM,
supra note 4.
21 See, e.g., AUDLEY, supra note 4.
22 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Review of U.S.-Mexico Environmental Rela-
tionship, in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 211–23.
23 See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 4, at 27; see also NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, supra
note 17, at 632–33; North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing before the H. Subcomm.
on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 102nd Cong., 129 (1991) (statement of Richard Kamp); Protecting the Envi-
ronment in North American Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, Hearing before the H.
Subcomm. on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy of the H. Comm. on Small
Business, 102nd Cong., 98–103 (1991) (statement of Mary E. Kelly) [hereinafter Protecting
the Environment Hearing].
24 Concerns over the preemption of domestic laws were heightened when a GATT arbitral
panel ruled in 1991 during the midst of the NAFTA negotiation that a U.S. embargo on
tuna imports from Mexico under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act was in
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downward harmonization of environmental laws and standards as trading
partners strive for common laws and standards, insufficient levels of
funding for environmental protection and remediation in Mexico, acceler-
ated exploitation of natural resources due to liberalization of certain
economic sectors, a general increase in levels of pollution due to economic
growth, and lack of environmental expertise, transparency, and public
participation in environment-related trade disputes.25
In general, these potential negative environmental effects of trade
liberalization are often categorized as: (1) legal or regulatory effects,
(2) scale effects, (3) sectoral, structural, or composition effects, and (4) prod-
uct or technological effects.26 Legal effects generally refer to differing levels
of domestic environmental safeguards or enforcement between trading
partners, or a ‘conflict of rules’ between trade regime rules and domestic
or international environmental laws.27 Differing levels of safeguards or
enforcement may give rise to a competitive advantage that results in a
downward harmonization of regulations [race to the bottom hypothesis],
or migration of dirty industries to countries with lower standards or en-
forcement [pollution havens or industrial flight hypotheses].28 A conflict
violation of GATT, see, e.g., Eric Christensen & Samantha Geffen, GATT Sets Its Net on
Environmental Regulation: The GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports
and the Need for Reform of the International Trading System, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 569, 593 (1992), http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol23/iss2/9 [https://perma
.cc/CKH4-D7R3]; Steve Charnovitz, GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues,
4 INT’L ENVTL. AFF. 203 (1992).
25 See, e.g., NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, supra note 17, at 632–33; Statement of Stewart
Hudson, supra note 17; Protecting the Environment Hearing, supra note 23, at 31–34
(statement of Michael McCloskey); Statement of Richard Kamp, supra note 17; Proposed
Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 213, 218 (1991) (statement of
David E. Ortman); Trade and Environment: Hearing before the S. Subcomm. on In-
ternational Trade of the S. Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 64, 66 (1991) (statement of
Lynn Greenwalt).
26 See OECD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRADE 12–17 (1994); Håkan Nordström
& Scott Vaughan, Special Studies 4: Trade and Environment 29–30, WTO (1999); Per G.
Fredriksson, Trade, Global Policy, and the Environment: New evidence and issues, in
TRADE, GLOBAL POLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 1–3 (World Bank Discussion Paper
No. 42, Per G. Fredriksson ed., Aug. 1999); Michael J. Ferrantino, International Trade,
Environmental Quality and Public Policy, 20 WORLD ECON. 43, 48–50 (1997).
27 OECD, supra note 26, at 16–17; Nordström & Vaughan, supra note 26, at 35; James
Salzman, Seattle’s Legal Legacy and Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements, 31
ENVTL. L. 503, 529 (2001).
28 Nordström & Vaughan, supra note 26, at 35–43; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.
OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1988); Matthew A. Cole, Examining the
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between trade regime rules and environmental laws may occur when
regime rules restrict the use of trade-related measures for enforcement
of international environmental laws and treaties, or they restrict domes-
tic environmental regulations if the regulations are determined to be non-
tariff barriers to trade.29
Negative scale effects correspond to higher levels of pollution or
faster depletion rates of natural resources due to expansion of production
and consumption activities associated with increased trade.30 Sectoral
effects are associated with changes in the patterns of production and re-
source use within specific sectors, as liberalized trade alters the interna-
tional location and intensity of production and consumption activities.
These effects foster a relocation of pollution sources between trading
partners.31 Sectoral effects may be negative when production or consump-
tion shifts to geographic areas that are unsuited to the nature or inten-
sity of the new activity.32 Negative product effects are associated with
changes in trade flows of particular environmentally damaging or harmful
products, such as hazardous waste, endangered species, or toxic chemi-
cals; for these effects, the characteristics of the product cause the adverse
environmental impact.33
Given the complexity of linkages between trade liberalization and
environmental quality, and the existence of other non-policy factors, it
is difficult to predict the specific environmental effects that may emerge
as trade is liberalized between countries. In general, however, the emer-
gence of negative scale, sectoral, and product effects largely depend on
the substantive focus or areas of liberalization of a particular free trade
agreement, whereas the legal effects depend more generally on non-
substantive trade regime rules or levels of environmental protection in
Environmental Case Against Free Trade, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 183, 190 (1999); Ferrantino,
supra note 26, at 48.
29 Nordström & Vaughan, supra note 26, at 29; Kerry Krutilla, World Trade, the GATT,
and the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES AND NATIONAL
TRENDS 87, 97–104 (Lynton K. Caldwell & Robert V. Bartlett eds., 1997); Cole, supra note
28, at 191.
30 Fredriksson, supra note 26, at 2; OECD, supra note 26, at 2.
31 Nordström & Vaughan, supra note 26, at 29; Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst,
Trade, The Environment, and Public Policy, in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES
3, 4–7 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992); OECD, supra note 26, at 13–14;
Fredriksson, supra note 26, at 2.
32 OECD, supra note 26, at 16; Nordström & Vaughan, supra note 26, at 29.
33 OECD, supra note 26, at 12–13; Peter L. Lallas, NAFTA and Evolving Approaches to
Identify and Address “Indirect” Environmental Impacts of International Trade, 5 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 519, 522, 526–27 (1998).
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each country. For NAFTA, the anticipated environmental effects of pri-
mary concern were the legal effects, followed by scale and sectoral effects,
especially in Mexico.
To address the potential effects of NAFTA identified by the envi-
ronmentalists, the Bush administration initially sought in 1991 and 1992
to incorporate a limited number of environmental policies directly into
NAFTA, as well as to develop supplemental environmental policies or pro-
grams in parallel with the trade agreement.34 However, when these mea-
sures proved insufficient to obtain support of the environmentalists for
NAFTA approval in 1992 and the three countries were unwilling to reopen
NAFTA,35 the incoming Clinton administration committed to establish,
through a supplemental agreement, an environmental commission that
would have substantial powers to address lax enforcement of environ-
mental laws in Mexico and provide remedies for damages.36
Based on this commitment, the United States, Mexico, and Canada
negotiated NAAEC in 1993, which established a trilateral commission, the
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (“CEC”), to
address the remaining environmental effects associated with NAFTA not
34 George H.W. Bush, Response of the Administration of George Bush to Issues Raised in
Connection with the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, in NAFTA
& THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 163 (proposing the establishment of a trilateral
commission to promote environmental cooperation, as well as separate programs to address
transboundary pollution along the U.S.-Mexico border); see also Report of the Adminis-
tration on The North American Free Trade Agreement and Actions Taken in Fulfillment
of the May 1, 1991 Commitments, in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 239.
35 See, e.g., JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that the negotiation of
NAFTA concluded in August 1992); see David Hendricks, NAFTA puts San Antonio in
trade spotlight, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS (July 31, 2015), http://www.expressnews
.com/150years/major-stories/article/NAFTA-put-San-Antonio-in-trade-spotlight-6418868
.php [https://perma.cc/MW9M-MDGT] (explaining how the final draft of the agreement
was initialed by U.S. President Bush, Mexican President Salinas, and Canadian Prime
Minister Mulroney in October 1992 and formally signed on December 17, 1992); see David
Alire & Michael O’Boyle, The rocky history of NAFTA, REUTERS (Sep. 1, 2017), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-timeline/the-rocky-history-of-nafta-idUSKCN1BC
5IL [https://perma.cc/KD3F-2FYB]; see Statement of Natural Resources Defense Council
on Administration Announcement of the North American Free Trade Agreement, in NAFTA
& THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 681 [hereinafter Statement of Natural Resources
Defense Council]; Stewart J. Hudson & Rodrigo J. Prudencio, National Wildlife Feder-
ation Report on the North American Commission on Environment and other Supple-
mental Environmental Agreements: Part Two of the NAFTA Package, in NAFTA & THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 691 (stating that several of the largest environmental
groups opposed NAFTA without additional environmental safeguards).
36 Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at The Student Center at North Carolina State
University, in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 263–66.
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addressed in the trade agreement itself.37 The negotiation of NAAEC
commenced in April and was concluded in August 1993.38 Overall, NAAEC
provides the CEC with several broad mandates to promote environ-
mental cooperation and integration of trade and environment objectives
under NAFTA, and improve enforcement of environmental laws in North
America. Taken together, the NAFTA environmental policies and NAAEC
were sufficient to address most of the environmentalists’ concerns and
garner their support for approval of NAFTA in 1993.39
II. NAFTA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK
The NAFTA environmental policies included in the trade agree-
ment itself and NAAEC collectively were intended to ensure that trade
liberalization in North America did not foster increased environmental
degradation, primarily in Mexico. The principal environmental policies
under the NAFTA framework are summarized in Table 1, along with the
specific environmental concern that each policy was intended to address.
The following provides a general discussion of the content and purpose
of the major policies. To facilitate discussion of the framework, the major
policies are grouped under traditional categories used to characterize the
potential negative trade-related environmental effects: (1) legal effects,
(2) scale effects, (3) sectoral effects, and (4) product effects.40 The policies
associated with scale, sectoral, and technological effects are discussed to-
gether as the same policies were used to address these three effects.
37 See Hills Letter on NAFTA Environmental Commission at 6, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 2,
1992) (indicating that Mexico and the United States also negotiated a bilateral Agreement
Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and
a North American Development Bank to develop and fund environmental infrastructure
projects along their shared border); 32 I.L.M. 1545 (1993); see, e.g., Craig E. Brackbill,
Financial Help for Utilities along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 91 J. OF AM. WATER WORKS
ASSOC. 129 (Apr, 1999).
38 Negotiation of NAFTA Side Agreements to Start by Mid-April, Wilson Says, INT’L TRADE
REP. 257, 257 (Feb. 17, 1993); Agreement on Side Deals Reached Among NAFTA Parties,
INT’L TRADE REP. 1352, 1352 (Aug. 18, 1993).
39 See, e.g., AUDLEY, supra note 4, at 121; MAYER, supra note 4.
40 See, e.g., Kevin B. Smith, Typologies, Taxonomies, and the Benefits of Policy Classi-
fication, 30 POL’Y STUD. J. 379, 379 (2002) (showing there are numerous approaches to
categorizing policies, and substantive policy content is a traditional policy dimension used
to classify public policies); Allen, supra note 15, at 50 (categorizing environmental policies
in U.S. free trade agreements as: aspirational, cooperative, quasi-regulatory, and permis-
sive policies); but see infra Part II (discussing how economists typically categorize trade-
related environmental effects as: (1) scale effects, (2) sectoral effects, (3) product effects,
and (4) legal effects and this typology will be used herein).
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TABLE 1: KEY ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS OF NAFTA AND NAAEC
Policy Location Environmental Concern
Implement trade agree-
ment consistent with 
environmental protection
NAFTA, Preamble
Pollution havens,
race to the bottom
Levels of protection
NAAEC, Part 2, 
Art. 3
Pollution havens,
race to the bottom
Effective enforcement
NAAEC, Part 2, 
Art. 5
Pollution havens,
race to the bottom
State-to-state dispute 
resolution
NAAEC, Part 5
Pollution havens,
race to the bottom
Public submissions process
NAAEC, Part 3, 
Art. 14 and 15
Pollution havens,
race to the bottom
Anti-rollback NAFTA, Art. 1114
Pollution havens,
race to the bottom
Minimize conflicts between
FTA and MEA obligations
NAFTA, Art. 104 Conflict of rules
Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards
and Technical Barriers to
Trade 
NAFTA, Chap. 7
and 9
Conflict of rules
Environmental expertise in
trade disputes
NAFTA, Chap. 20 Conflict of rules
Procedural guarantees
NAAEC, Art. 5 (2),
Art. 6 and Art. 7
Lack of transparency
and public participa-
tion; also pollution ha-
vens, race to the bottom
Opportunities for public
participation
NAAEC, Part 1,
Art. 1 and Part 3,
Art. 5, 16, 17, and 18
Lack of transparency
and public
participation
S
c
a
le
, 
S
e
c
to
r
a
l,
a
n
d
 P
r
o
d
u
c
t
E
ff
e
c
ts Environmental 
cooperation
NAAEC, Part 3, Art.
10 (1), Art. 11 (6) and
Art. 9 (3)
Overexploitation of 
natural resources,
increased pollution, and
pollution havens
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A. Legal Effects
Concerns over the legal effects of NAFTA on environmental pro-
tection dominated the NAFTA negotiations and the key demand of the
environmentalists was the establishment of a process with recourse to
punitive measure to ensure the countries enforced their environmental
laws.41 In particular, the environmentalists sought a process for filing
claims of non-enforcement with ultimate recourse to sanctions or fines,
in other words, a process that had “teeth.”42 At the same time, environ-
mentalists wanted a process that would provide private parties with
standing to initiate investigations of lax enforcement of environmental
laws.43 In addition, the environmentalists sought policies that would safe-
guard domestic environmental laws and regulations as well as obliga-
tions under multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) from being
challenged by trade regime rules and assurances that environmental
expertise could be brought to bear when challenges were actually made
under NAFTA.44 A suite of environmental policies was included in both
NAFTA and NAAEC to address these major concerns.
1. Lax Enforcement of Environmental Laws and Pollution Havens
Lax enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico was the sin-
gle most important environmental concern identified for NAFTA.45 The
41 Confidential interview with private sector representative, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6,
2003); Confidential interview with U.S. government representative, via telephone, Carlisle,
PA (Mar. 17, 2003). Interviews cited herein were conducted for Linda Allen, The Politics
of Structural Choice of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation: The Theoretical
Foundations of the Design of International Environmental Institutions (Apr. 2005) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with author).
42 Hudson & Prudencio, supra note 35, at 693; William Snape, NACE: Some Functions
and Form, in SHAPING CONSENSUS: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION ON THE ENVIRON-
MENT AND NAFTA 34 (Sarah Richardson ed., 1993) [hereinafter SHAPING CONSENSUS];
Robert Housman, Enforcement and Trade Sanctions, in SHAPING CONSENSUS, supra, at 23;
Recommendations for a North American Commission on the Environment, Prepared by
Five Environmental NGOs, in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 706; Green
Groups Press Kantor for Powerful NAFTA Environmental Commission at 8–9, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (Mar. 5, 1993).
43 Confidential interview with private sector representative, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6,
2003).
44 Environmental Group Coalition Proposes Stronger NAFTA Safeguards, INT’L TRADE REP.
1097, 1097 (Jun. 24, 1992); Gary Hufbauer, Functions of NACE: Trade Sanctions and Pro-
cedural Safeguards, in SHAPING CONSENSUS, supra note 42, at 17; Justin R. Ward, Natural
Resources Defense Council Statement Regarding Environmental Protection in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 670.
45 Confidential interview with U.S. non-governmental organization representative, in
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prevailing view when NAFTA was being negotiated was that Mexico had
environmental laws comparable to those of the United States but it did
not effectively enforce its laws, and the lax enforcement was largely due
to limited institutional capacity and fiscal resources.46 Regardless, the
lax enforcement could give rise to pollution havens in Mexico as dirty in-
dustries relocated to that country to gain a competitive advantage due to
lower costs for environmental compliance.47 Moreover, in response to this
industry migration, the other trading partners would weaken their en-
forcement or “roll-back” their regulations to remain competitive, result-
ing in an erosion of environmental protection in the other countries and
a “race to the bottom.”48
To address the lax enforcement, the NAFTA environmental policy
framework included several policies to promote effective enforcement of
domestic environmental laws in the territories of the three trading part-
ners. These policies were included in NAAEC and consisted of a com-
mitment to effectively enforce domestic environmental laws49 as well as
the establishment of two mechanisms for ensuring the trading partners
adhered to that commitment: a state-to-state consultation and dispute
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6, 2003); confidential interview with U.S. non-governmental or-
ganization representative, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 7, 2003); confidential interview with
U.S. government representative, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 17, 2003); confidential in-
terview with U.S. government representative, via telephone, Washington, D.C. (Jun. 16,
2003); see also NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, supra note 17, at 634; Two Key Lawmakers Request
‘Action Plan’ From President Bush on Mexico Trade Talks, INT’L TRADE REP. 377, 377
(Mar. 13, 1991); Critics of North American Free Trade Pact Say Environment, Labor Safe-
guards Needed, INT’L TRADE REP. 1294, 1294 (Aug. 28, 1991).
46 Evaluation of Mexico’s Environmental Laws and Regulations—Interim Report of EPA
Findings, in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 195–97; Evaluation of Mexico’s
Environmental Laws, in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 583, 615; U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE [GAO], NAT. SEC. DIV., GAO/NSAID-91-227, REP. TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
U.S.-MEXICO TRADE, INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCE-
MENT (May 1991).
47 Environmental Safeguards for the North American Free Trade Agreement, Priority Rec-
ommendations to Negotiators and Congress, With Model Language for Key Provisions, in
NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 675; NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, supra note 17.
48 The North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearings before the H. Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 64–66 (1991) (statement of Stewart Hudson); Protecting the En-
vironment Hearing, supra note 23, at 32–33 (statement of Michael McCloskey); see also
DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 2 (1994).
49 NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 5; see also NAFTA, supra note 1, at preamble (“STRENGTHEN
the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations”).
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resolution process50 and a public submissions process.51 The state-to-state
consultation and dispute resolution process was intended to be the prin-
cipal policy for rectifying lax enforcement; under this process, the coun-
tries can submit complaints against each other for failure to effectively
enforce their domestic environmental laws with ultimate recourse to sanc-
tions or fines.52 Given its sanctioning potential, the dispute resolution
process has the potential to be highly coercive if used, thus it was touted
as the “teeth” of NAFTA to ensure environmental laws are enforced.53
The public submission process was the other mechanism estab-
lished to ensure effective enforcement of environmental laws and under
this process, private citizens or organizations can submit complaints of lax
enforcement of domestic laws for independent review and verification.54
These complaints are validated via a fact-finding process conducted by
CEC that ends with the preparation of a factual record; however the com-
plaints are not linked to a formal dispute resolution process with recourse
to sanctions.55 Rather, the public submission process was intended to serve
as a spotlight remedy that can focus public scrutiny on enforcement ac-
tivities and thereby generate pressure for remedial or corrective action.56
Lastly, the three countries committed to make available, within
their respective territories, judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative pro-
ceedings to sanction or remedy violations of its environmental laws.57
Moreover, these proceedings must be fair, equitable, and open, and com-
ply with due process of law.58 The countries also committed to provide
private access to remedies, through which parties can request “competent
authorities to investigate alleged violations of its environmental laws
and regulations.”59 In general, these proceedings could also be used by
50 NAAEC, supra note 3, Part IV.
51 Id. arts. 14 & 15.
52 Kevin W. Patton, Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 87–90 (1994).
53 HOGENBOOM, supra note 4; MAYER, supra note 4.
54 NAAEC, supra note 3, arts. 14 & 15; ENVTL. LAW INST., FINAL REPORT: ISSUES RE-
LATED TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION (2003).
55 NAAEC, supra note 3, arts. 14 & 15.
56 See, e.g., Geoffrey Garver, Citizen Spotlight is Beginning to Show Results, 18 THE ENVTL.
F. 34 (2001); David Markell, The Citizen Spotlight Process, 18 THE ENVTL. F. 32 (2000);
David Schorr, NAFTA and the Environment: A Review of the Basic Issues, in FREE TRADE:
RISKS AND REWARDS 226 (L.I. MacDonald ed., 2000) [hereinafter FREE TRADE].
57 NAAEC, supra note 3, arts. 5 (2), 6 & 7.
58 Id. art. 7.
59 Id. art. 6.
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private parties to raise claims of lax enforcement entirely within the do-
mestic arena.
2. Rollback of Domestic Regulations and Race to the Bottom
Closely related to concerns over lax enforcement and pollution ha-
vens were concerns that countries would rollback their enforcement of
regulations to remain competitive if one country had weaker levels of pro-
tection or enforcement.60 Policies to address the potential regulatory roll-
back and a race to the bottom included a commitment under NAFTA to not
waive or otherwise derogate from domestic environmental measures in
order to retain or attract investment.61 The anti-rollback commitment can
be subject to consultation between the parties but not dispute resolution.62
In conjunction with this commitment, NAFTA included a provision that
recognizes the right of the countries to establish their own environmental
standards as long as they were not arbitrary or a disguised restriction on
trade and investment.63 Additionally, NAAEC included a non-binding policy
under which the NAFTA countries commit to have their domestic envi-
ronmental laws provide for and encourage high levels of environmental
protection.64 Taken together, these policies provided hortatory, albeit non-
enforceable, commitments for the NAFTA countries to maintain existing
high levels of environmental laws and regulations.
3. A Conflict of Rules
A separate legal concern unrelated to levels of enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws was the potential for a ‘conflict of rules’ between trade re-
gime rules and domestic or international environmental laws.65 A conflict
between trade regime rules and environmental laws may occur when re-
gime rules or trade disciplines restrict the use of trade-related measures for
enforcement of MEAs,66 or when rules restrict domestic environmental
60 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 22, at 230–31.
61 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114.
62 Id.
63 Id. art. 1106(6).
64 Id. art. 3.
65 OECD, supra note 26, at 16–17; Nordström & Vaughan, supra note 26, at 35–46; Salzman,
supra note 27, at 529.
66 Around twenty MEAs, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, have “trade restrictive measures to address transboundary and global
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regulations if they are determined to be discriminatory or non-tariff bar-
riers to trade.67 This particular concern came to the fore after a GATT ar-
bitral panel issued a ruling in 1991 that U.S. restrictions on tuna imports
from Mexico violated the provisions of that trade agreement, forcing the
United States to either remove the restrictions or be subject to trade
sanctions.68 The ruling highlighted the potential for trade regime rules
to impede the implementation of domestic environmental regulations,69
and NAFTA and NAAEC included several policies to address a potential
conflict of rules.
To address a potential conflict between trade rules and MEAs,
NAFTA includes a provision that allows the trade-related measures un-
der MEAs to take precedence over obligations under the trade agreement.70
The NAFTA countries also have the right to resolve trade disputes re-
lated to MEAs or environmental and health-related measures (either san-
itary and phytosanitary measures or standards-related measures) under
the substantive and procedural provisions of NAFTA rather than GATT.71
Both NAFTA and NAAEC allow for use of environmental experts in their
ecological problems.” Robyn Eckersley, The Big Chill: The WTO and Multilateral Envi-
ronmental Agreements, 4 GLOB. ENVTL. POL. 24, 24 (May 2004).
67 See, e.g., Nordström & Vaughan, supra note 26; Krutilla, supra note 29; Cole, supra
note 28; ESTY, supra note 48, at 218–20.
68 AUDLEY, supra note 4, at 73; see also Ted L. McDorman, The 1991 U.S.-Mexico GATT
Panel Report on Tuna and Dolphin: Implications for Trade and Environment Conflicts,
17 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 461, 462–63, 471 (1992), http://scholarship.law.unc.edu
/ncilj/vol17/iss3/2 [https://perma.cc/9HH9-EM32].
69 Charnovitz, supra note 24, at 153; ESTY, supra note 48, at 29; Statement of Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, supra note 35, at 682.
70 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104 (relating to environmental and conservation agree-
ments, “[i]n the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade
obligations set out in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora . . . , the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, . . . the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal . . . such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the
inconsistency, provided that where a Party has a choice among equally effective and rea-
sonably available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the al-
ternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement.”).
71 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2005(3) (“In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 where
the responding Party claims that its action is subject to Article 104 (Relation to Environ-
mental and Conservation Agreements) and requests in writing that the matter be con-
sidered under this Agreement, the complaining Party may, in respect of that matter,
thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under this Agreement.”).
The multilateral trading system embodied by the GATT is now overseen by the World
Trade Organization. WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
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respective state-to-state dispute resolution processes,72 which provides
some assurance that trade disputes related to environmental standards
or enforcement will take into consideration the environmental aspects of
the standards or enforcement. NAAEC also included policies that allowed
for CEC to assist the NAFTA Free Trade Commission73 (“FTC”) in environ-
mental-related trade issues.74 Lastly, NAFTA’s provisions for standards-
related measures provides some assurance that environmental regulations
may not be challenged as technical barriers to trade,75 although these
particular protections were considered weak from the onset.76 In general,
all of these provisions were intended to reduce the potential for a conflict
between trade rules and environmental laws and standards.
One policy that was included in NAFTA that was not associated
with addressing the legal environmental effects of the trade agreement but
subsequently presented a new type of conflict of rules was the Chapter 11
foreign investor protections. In general, Chapter 11 establishes the rights
of private investors to challenge domestic environmental regulatory de-
cisions within the investor’s host country as a “regulatory expropriation.”77
72 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2007. “The Commission may: (a) call on such technical ad-
visers or create such working groups or expert groups as it deems necessary . . . .” Id.
“Role of Experts. On request of a disputing Party, or on its own initiative, the panel may
seek information and technical advice from any person or body that it deems appropriate,
provided that the disputing Parties so agree and subject to such terms and conditions as
such Parties may agree.” Id. art. 2014. 
On request of a disputing Party or, unless the disputing Parties dis-
approve, on its own initiative, the panel may request a written report
of a scientific review board on any factual issue concerning environ-
mental, health, safety or other scientific matters raised by a disputing
Party in a proceeding, subject to such terms and conditions as such
Parties may agree.
Id. art. 2015.
73 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001. The Free Trade Commission (“FTC”) is the intergov-
ernmental body that oversees the implementation of NAFTA.
74 NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 6. The CEC has the authority to: 1) assist the NAFTA FTC
in environment-related matters, serving as a point of inquiry on NAFTA environmental
goals and objectives, 2) assist with NAFTA art. 1114, and 3) identify experts for NAFTA
committees, working groups, and bodies.
75 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 904(1) (describing the Right to Take Standards-Related
Measures: “Each Party may, in accordance with this Agreement, adopt, maintain or apply
any standards-related measure, including any such measure relating to safety, the pro-
tection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers, and any
measure to ensure its enforcement or implementation.”).
76 JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 4, at 20.
77 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110 (including prohibitions against direct or indirect nation-
alization or expropriation or any “measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation”
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If a regulatory decision is determined to be “tantamount to expropria-
tion,” the host country is required to compensate the private investor.78
Not only does Chapter 11 have the potential to impose serious costs on a
host country, the potential for private investors to pursue future claims
against regulatory decisions may lead to a regulatory “chill”, where govern-
ment officials are hesitant to rigorously enforce existing environmental
laws or enact new laws in fear that they may be challenged as a regula-
tory expropriation.79 The regulatory chill would result in a weakening of
levels of enforcement or protection.
4. Lack of Transparency and Public Participation
Historically, due to the sensitive nature of trade policy negotia-
tions, they often had been conducted in secrecy with little input from the
public, and this lack of transparency and public participation was criti-
cized by environmentalists throughout the negotiation of NAFTA.80 Some
steps were taken during the negotiation to improve transparency and
promote public input, for example, by appointing environmental group
representatives to trade advisory committees and conducting frequent
briefings with them.81 In addition, specific policies were included in NAFTA
and NAAEC to allow for public participation during implementation of
both agreements. These policies included the establishment of public
unless the expropriation is “(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c)
in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compen-
sation.”); see, e.g., Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State
Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 7 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 171, 191 (2007) (ex-
plaining that regulatory expropriations are akin to regulatory takings).
78 Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 125, 129; see generally Kathleen Cooper et al., Seek-
ing a Regulatory Chill in Canada: The Dow Agrosciences NAFTA Chapter 11 Challenge
to the Quebec Pesticides Management Code, 7 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5 (2014);
HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., NAFTA’S CHAP-
TER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT, ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PRO-
CESS ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1999).
79 Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 129; THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, GETTING IT RIGHT:
A PEOPLE’S GUIDE TO RENEGOTIATING NAFTA, at 12–14 (2017).
80 See, e.g., Recommendations for a North American Commission on the Environment, supra
note 42, at 707; Letter from Seven NGOs to Ambassador Michael Kantor Regarding Sup-
plemental Agreements, in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 715.
81 Confidential interview with U.S. government official, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 24,
2003); confidential interview with U.S. government official, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26,
2003). See also Bush, supra note 34, at 174; JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 4, at 29.
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advisory committees for the CEC at the national and international level,82
and the ability of private parties to present final briefs under NAFTA’s
state-to-state dispute resolution,83 all of which provided avenues for pub-
lic input and participation in the implementation of the NAFTA environ-
mental policies.
B. Scale, Sectoral, and Product Effects
The potential for trade liberalization to give rise to increased levels
of pollution and exploitation of natural resources can occur in any country
regardless of levels of regulatory enforcement simply because liberalized
trade fosters changes in the patterns of production and consumption within
the countries. Concerns over potential scale and sectoral effects were raised
during the NAFTA negotiations, and in general, addressing them requires
a robust domestic environmental management regime. Punitive measures
such as the state-to-state dispute resolution process may provide some
incentive for undertaking robust environmental management, but more
cooperative initiatives can also address the source of the problem by build-
ing institutional capacity and providing additional resources.84 Towards
that end, NAAEC includes policies focused on building institutional ca-
pacity on a voluntary basis.
1. Increased Pollution and Exploitation of Natural Resources
To address the potential increases in pollution and exploitation
of natural resources due to scale, sectoral, and product effects, the primary
policy prescriptions under the NAFTA policy framework were policies that
fostered voluntary environmental cooperation to build the institutional
82 NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 1, 16–18 (stating, “[t]he objectives of this Agreement are
to: . . . . (h) promote transparency and public participation in the development of envi-
ronmental laws, regulations and policies.”). NAAEC also authorizes the establishment
of three advisory bodies: art. 16 (Joint Public Advisory Committee), art. 17 (National
Advisory Committees), and art. 18 (Governmental Committees). Id. at arts. 16–18.
83 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2013 (third party participation: “[a] Party that is not a dis-
puting Party, on delivery of a written notice to the disputing Parties and to its Section
of the Secretariat, shall be entitled to attend all hearings, to make written and oral sub-
missions to the panel and to receive written submissions of the disputing Parties.”).
84 See, e.g., COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org [https://perma.cc/B5KJ
-BFUK] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
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capacity of the trading partners, in particular Mexico, and to strengthen
their various environmental protection regimes.85 Recognizing that the
weak enforcement of environmental laws and low levels of environmental
protection were due largely to lack of capacity, NAFTA anticipated that en-
hanced institutional capacity would strengthen efforts to effectively enforce
environmental laws, as well as improve the domestic environmental man-
agement of natural resources and pollution, but through cooperation rather
than coercion. The NAFTA policy framework includes numerous policies
focused on promoting environmental cooperation between the NAFTA coun-
tries under NAAEC, which was largely envisioned as its primary mandate86
with the majority of CEC’s work focused on cooperative activities.87
III. POLICY FRAMEWORK SHORTCOMINGS—RHETORIC VS. REALITY
Given the ground-breaking nature of the NAFTA environmental
policies, a considerable amount of research focused on their implementa-
tion over the years. In general, the research indicates that the impact of
the policies has been underwhelming and had minimal to no effect on en-
hancing environmental protection or improving enforcement of environ-
mental laws in the NAFTA countries.88 Major criticisms of the policies
include the placement of the obligation to effectively enforce environmen-
tal laws, and the associated state-to-state dispute resolution process,
within NAAEC rather than NAFTA;89 the problematic implementation
of the public submission process;90 the limited number of MEAs protected
85 See, e.g., Linda J. Allen, The North American Agreement on Environmental Co-
operation: Has It Fulfilled Its Promises and Potential? An Empirical Study of Policy Ef-
fectiveness, 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 121, 123 (2012); Greg Block, The CEC
Cooperative Program of Work, in GREENING NAFTA: THE N. AM. COMM’N FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION. 25, 28 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) [hereinafter GREEN-
ING NAFTA].
86 Confidential interview with Canadian government official, in Ottawa, Ont. (Feb. 10,
2003); confidential interview with U.S. government official, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22,
2003); confidential interview with U.S. government official, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26,
2003); see also Hills Letter on NAFTA Environmental Commission, supra note 37, at 6.
87 NAAEC, supra note 3, at art. 11(6).
88 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 85, at 164; Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M. Doughman, Soft
Teeth in the Back of the Mouth: The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented,
10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 651, 725–26 (1998).
89 Mach, supra note 6.
90 Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 129–30; see also Jonathan G. Dorn, NAAEC Citizen
Submissions Against Mexico: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of a Participatory Approach
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under NAFTA Article 104;91 weak protection of environmental laws and
regulations related to process and production methods from challenge
under trade rules;92 the use of NAFTA Chapter 11 investor protections
to challenge implementation of domestic environmental laws as regula-
tory takings;93 the underfunding of the CEC in general;94 and the absence
of specific policies to address emerging environmental concerns, such as
overfishing and illegal timber and wildlife trafficking.95 Other lesser crit-
icisms include the lack of implementation of commitments to ensure that
“laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental protection”;96
lack of transparency of NAFTA governance;97and NAFTA’s weak commit-
ment to sustainable development.98 Many of these criticisms have been
used to call for strengthening of the NAFTA environmental policies.99 The
following examines the major perceived shortcomings in light of existing
research and discusses how the rhetoric matches the reality.
A. Location of Enforcement Obligations and State-to-State Dispute
Resolution Process
The state-to-state dispute resolution process was the primary mech-
anism included in the NAAEC to address lax enforcement of environmental
to Environmental Law Enforcement, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 139–40 (2007);
Christopher Tollefson, Stormy Weather: The Recent History of the Citizen Submission Process
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, in LINKING TRADE, EN-
VIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION: NAFTA EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 161 (John
J. Kirton & Virginia W. Maclaren, eds., 2002) [hereinafter LINKING TRADE]; Paul S. Kibel,
Awkward Evolution: Citizen Enforcement at the North American Environmental Commis-
sion, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10769, 10769 (2002); David J. Blair, The CEC’s Citizen Submission
Process: Still a Model for Reconciling Trade and the Environment?, 12 J. ENV’T & DEV. 295
(2003); Garver, supra note 12; Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission
Process of Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooper-
ation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 417 (2004); Hester, supra note 12.
91 Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 134.
92 See id.
93 Id. at 128–29.
94 Id. at 129.
95 Id. at 136; see also U.S. Environmental Groups Urge Inclusion of Lacey Act Language
in TPP, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (June 4, 2010).
96 Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 129.
97 Id. at 136.
98 Id. at 126.
99 See, e.g., Michael McAuliff, NAFTA Report Warns of Trade Deal Environmental Disas-
ters, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/nafta
-environment_n_4938556.html [https://perma.cc/6UFS-LV2P].
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laws, but the process is widely seen as ineffective.100 According to critics, the
limited effectiveness of the process is due to the fact that state-to-state
dispute resolution process (and associated obligation to effectively enforce
environmental laws) is located within the environmental side agreement,
NAAEC, rather than the trade agreement itself, which has its own state-
to-state dispute resolution process.101 Although the obligation itself is
adequate, the NAAEC dispute resolution process is perceived to be in-
ferior to the NAFTA process for two reasons: the NAAEC process is more
onerous than the NAFTA process, and the NAAEC process is overseen
by environmental officials who lack expertise in resolving trade-related
disputes.102 Relocating the obligation to be under NAFTA would remedy
both of these shortcomings. While both the NAAEC and NAFTA dispute
resolution processes include comparable procedures for resolving dis-
putes between the trading partners, the NAAEC process is undoubtedly
more convoluted, and includes numerous escape clauses and legal un-
certainties, and a very difficult means test103 for triggering the arbitration
phase of the NAAEC process compared to the NAFTA process.104 These
differences, coupled with oversight by environmental rather than trade
100 SABAA A. KHAN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC IN-
TEREST CONSIDERATIONS IN NAFTA RENEGOTIATION 3 (2017), https://www.iisd.org/sites
/default/files/publications/environmental-public-interest-nafta-renegotiations.pdf [https://
perma.cc/22UW-DCQX].
101 See, e.g., id.
102 See, e.g., Edward Hymson et al., Increasing Benefits and Reducing Harm Caused by
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 S. L. J. 219, 232 (2009) (discussing the lack
of enforceability of the NAAEC process).
103 The criteria for allowing a dispute to move forward to arbitration is that there needs
to be a persistent pattern of non-enforcement that gives rise to some competitive advan-
tage within the trade relationships. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 31(2).
104 Robert Housman described the procedures leading to sanctions as “absurd.” VED P.
NANDA & GEORGE R. PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 586 (2d rev. ed. 2013) (quoting INT’L ENV’T DAILY, BNA (Sept. 14, 1993)).
“Someday, [in] some bizarre set of circumstances where the planets are aligned,” trade sanc-
tions could be imposed for a NAFTA partner’s persistent failure to enforcement its do-
mestic environmental statutes. Id. See also The North American Free Trade Agreement
and its Environmental Side Agreements: S. Hrg. 103-329 Before the Comm. On Envtl. and
Pub. Works, 103rd Cong. 39 (1993) (statement of Peter A.A. Berle, President and CEO, Na-
tional Audubon Society); The National Environmental Policy Act and The North American
Free Trade Agreement: S. Hrg. 103-219 Before the Comm. On Envtl. and Pub. Works,
103rd Cong. 35 (1993) (statement of Rodger Schlickeisen, President of Defenders of Wild-
life); Raustiala, supra note 12, at 43; Garver, supra note 12, at 39; Knox, The Neglected
Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6, at 397.
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officials, create the perception that the NAAEC process would be difficult
to administer, and unlikely to run its full course and result in sanctions,
which are the “teeth” in the process essential for remedying lax enforce-
ment of environmental laws.105
As a result, critics have pushed for relocating the obligation to
enforce environmental laws effectively to NAFTA itself, where breaches
of this obligation would be subject to the better functioning NAFTA
state-to-state dispute resolution process.106 This change in policy would
also bring NAFTA up to par with all other U.S. trade agreements. Since
NAFTA entered into effect, the United States concluded twelve other re-
gional or bilateral trade agreements, and for all of these trade agree-
ments with the exception of one, the obligation to enforce environmental
laws effectively has been included within the trade agreements rather
than an environmental side agreement.107 Moreover, the enforcement ob-
ligation is subject to the same state-to-state dispute resolution process
as all other obligations under the trade agreements.108 Thus, the argu-
ment that the policy for effective enforcement under NAAEC is inade-
quate and should be changed seems reasonable. However, in reality, it
is unlikely that the countries will ever pursue claims of non-enforcement
against each other under the dispute resolution process, regardless of
where the process is located, because the conditions required for trigger-
ing the process never materialized, and even if perchance they do, the
countries would be very reluctant to initiate the process and publicly crit-
icize each other’s domestic enforcement activities.109
105 See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM.
J. OF INT’L L. 259, 266 (1992).
106 NAFTA, supra note 1, at ch. 20 (defines the state-to-state dispute resolution process
for the trade agreement).
107 See Allen, supra note 15, at 49.
108 Id. at 50.
109 See Scott Vaughan, Thinking North American Environmental Management, in 2 THE
ART OF THE ST. 13 (Thomas J. Courchene, Donald J. Savoie, & Daniel Schwanen, eds.,
2004) (stating that “neither NAFTA nor NAAEC fine and sanction measures were ini-
tiated. A simple explanation may well be that trade officials in all three North American
countries retain a profound dislike for the punitive and heavy handed nature of the envi-
ronmental safeguards . . .”); see also Chris Wold, Evaluating NAFTA and the Commission
for Environmental Cooperation: Lessons for Integrating Trade and Environment in Free
Trade Agreements, 28 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 201, 236 (2008) (recognizing that the
FTAs negotiated subsequent to NAFTA include obligations to effectively enforce envi-
ronmental laws, and these obligations are enforceable through dispute settlement pro-
cedures under the trade agreement, but that “[b]ecause these provisions are included in
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First, with respect to the conditions required to trigger the dis-
pute resolution process, there are two conditions that could be used to jus-
tify action under this process: the existence of widespread non-enforcement
of environmental laws, and the emergence of pollution havens. These
conditions are clearly related, as widespread non-enforcement is believed
to give rise to pollution havens.110 However, as a practical matter, it may
be easier to identify pollution havens than weak enforcement patterns,
even though the dispute resolution process is tied to enforcement levels.
In order to initiate the dispute resolution process under NAAEC, the coun-
tries are required to first conduct consultations, during which the aggrieved
Party must demonstrate that there “has been a persistent pattern of fail-
ure by that other Party to effectively enforce its environmental law.”111
To move beyond consultation and request an arbitral panel for formal
dispute resolution, the aggrieved Party must further demonstrate that
the persistent pattern of non-enforcement affects trade in some manner.112
Since NAFTA entered into effect twenty-four years ago, none of the NAFTA
countries has ever filed a claim, or even asserted, that there was wide-
spread non-enforcement of environmental laws that affected trade.113
the FTA itself, rather than a side agreement, the United States championed such pro-
visions as further integration of trade and the environment. Because there is no legal dif-
ference between placing the environmental provisions in a side agreement or in the FTA
itself, this benefit is more imagined than real.”).
110 But see Andreas Waldkirch & Munisamy Gopinath, Pollution Haven or Hythe?*: New
Evidence from Mexico 1–4 (May 27, 2005), http://www.colby.edu/economics/faculty/thtieten
/ec476/mexpollution.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6VF-7SPH].
111 NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 22(1) (stating that the determination of a persistent pattern
of non-enforcement itself may not be possible); see also Vaughan, supra note 109, at 7
(“There is no international legal or management standard that defines how to measure
the effective enforcement of environmental regulations.”). The criteria for this standard
set forth in NAAEC “is incoherent, opaque and based on an awkward double-negative.”
Id. These criteria, coupled with “the failure of the NAAEC to define clearly what a pat-
tern of regulatory non-enforcement looks like,” results in a policy that is “fundamentally
flawed, the product of pandering to an incoherent political agenda as opposed to aligning
legal remedies to actual needs.” Id.
112 NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 24(1) (noting that a Party must show that the “alleged per-
sistent pattern of failure by the Party . . . to effectively enforce its environmental law re-
lates to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods
or provide services: 1. traded between the territories of the Parties; or 2. that compete,
in the territory of the Party complained against, with goods or services produced or
provided by persons of another Party.”).
113 The United States and its trading partners have not filed any claims of persistent pat-
terns of non-enforcement under the other twelve free trade agreements that the United
States has concluded since NAFTA. But see Tollefson, supra note 90, at 27.
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One reason the countries may not have pursued these claims is
that there has been an absence of widespread patterns of non-enforcement;
however, identifying these patterns may be difficult. An alternative ap-
proach could be to identify pollution havens and deteriorating environ-
mental conditions in the NAFTA countries. While the existence of polluting
industries and increased pollution does not necessarily mean a country
is not enforcing its laws, it is a more tangible indicator that something
may be amiss. Moreover, the primary rationale for including a policy on
effective enforcement in NAFTA was the concern over creation of pollu-
tion havens in Mexico.114 Thus, the existence of pollution havens could be
a proxy for weak enforcement.115 Research to date, however, does not iden-
tify the emergence of pollution havens or a significant deterioration of envi-
ronmental conditions in any of the NAFTA countries, especially Mexico.
While it is very difficult to make broad generalizations about the im-
pact of NAFTA on the environment, in general, the trend in Mexico towards
improving environmental protection has been positive under NAFTA,
although the factors that influenced this trend have not necessarily been
related to trade liberalization under this trade agreement. Overall, since
NAFTA’s inception, there has been no relative increase in pollution be-
cause of NAFTA’s provisions, nor has Mexico become a pollution haven.116
With respect to levels of energy use and common pollutants, research indi-
cates “that the extreme predictions of the outcomes of NAFTA have not ma-
terialized. Rather, trends that were already present before the introduction
of NAFTA continued and, in some cases, improved post-NAFTA, but not
yet in a dramatic way.”117 At the same time, there has been a significant
increase in the market for environmental goods and services in Mexico,
which nearly doubled in size from 1995 to 2005, reaching $4.7 billion at the
end of this period.118 In general, this increase in environmental goods and
services was primarily due to stronger domestic environmental regulations
and enforcement over the years, and a tendency for foreign manufacturers
114 See Waldkirch & Gopinath, supra note 110, at 1–4.
115 See id.
116 KEVIN GALLAGHER, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, MEXICO, NAFTA, AND BEYOND
31 (2004); see also Vaughan, supra note 109, at 7 (“Looking at the pollution-haven and race-
to-the-bottom claims a decade later, we find little empirical evidence showing any sys-
tematic occurrence of either.”).
117 David I. Stern, The Effect of NAFTA on Energy and Environmental Efficiency in Mexico,
35 POL’Y STUD. J. 291, 291 (2007).
118 Grant Ferrier, The evolution of the environmental industry in the post-NAFTA era in
Mexico, 10 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 147, 151 (2010).
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to adhere to higher global environmental standards.119 Along similar
lines, expenditures for environmental protection by businesses increased
after NAFTA entered into effect, and these changes were driven by various
factors, including foreign shareholder pressure, government regulation,
and “the need to comply with standards demanded by customers in the
international market.”120 Thus, the larger export-oriented industries in
Mexico have not engaged in a race to the bottom, and greater exports from
Mexico “provided an incentive to increase environmental investment.”121
Overall, it appears that NAFTA has not given rise to pollution havens122
in Mexico, or the other countries, which may also explain the lack of claims
for non-enforcement.
The fact that the countries have not filed claims related to persis-
tent patterns of non-enforcement could also be because the countries are
hesitant to criticize each other’s domestic enforcement activities,123 and
to a large degree, that is the reason why the NAAEC dispute resolution
process differs in its design from the NAFTA dispute resolution process.
In late 1992, when the NAFTA countries agreed to subject their domestic
enforcement activities to independent review and sanctions, they were
concerned that the process would infringe upon sovereignty and be used
towards protectionist ends.124 To address these concerns, the countries
intentionally crafted the NAAEC dispute resolution process such that it
was unlikely to ever run its full course to the sanctioning phase if initiated;
119 Id. at 156–57; see also Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Re-
gime, supra note 6, at 398 (The NAFTA environmental regimes “ha[ve] contributed to
stronger environmental protections, especially in Mexico.”).
120 Lilia Domínguez-Villalobos & Flor Brown-Grossman, NAFTA’s Impact on Business En-
vironmental Decision Making, 35 POL’Y STUD. J. 245, 246 (2007).
121 Id. at 257.
122 Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6, at 398
(“[s]tudies, including those prepared under the auspices of the CEC itself, have consis-
tently indicated that the fear of pollution havens is largely baseless. The marginal costs
of abating pollution in developed countries, such as the United States, are simply not
high enough to induce companies to move their operations abroad in search of lower costs
in countries with lower environmental standards.”).
123 See Garver, supra note 12, at 38.
124 See, e.g., Sarah Richardson, Conclusions: An Emerging Consensus, in SHAPING CON-
SENSUS, supra note 42, at 37; Canada Against Using Trade Sanctions To Enforce Supple-
mental Pacts, Weekes Says, INT’L TRADE REP. 486, 486 (Mar. 24, 1993); Business Groups
Warn Kantor That Draft Texts are Flawed, INT’L TRADE REP. 946, 946 (June 9, 1993); Trade
Sanctions to Enforce NAFTA Could Threaten Pact, Governors Told, INT’L TRADE REP. 1026,
1026 (June 23, 1993); Gilbert Winham, Enforcement of Environmental Measures: Negotiating
the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, 3 J. OF ENV’T & DEV. 29, 29 (1994).
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the process would prima facie satisfy the political demands of environ-
mentalists, but, in practice, prove to be ineffective.125 The onerous design
of the dispute resolution process is one obvious indication of the countries’
reluctance to pursue claims of non-enforcement of environmental laws
against each other; however, the countries also demonstrate their reluc-
tance in other ways. In particular, the NAFTA countries failed to develop
model rules of procedure126 or establish a roster of potential panelists for
125 Allen, supra note 41; confidential interview with Mexican government representative,
in Mexico City, Mex. (Apr. 3, 2003); confidential interview with Mexican government
representative, via telephone, Washington, D.C. (May 15, 2003); confidential interview
with Canadian government official, in Ottawa, Ont. (Feb. 10, 2003); confidential inter-
view with Canadian government official, in Ottawa, Ont. (Feb. 11, 2003); confidential in-
terview with U.S. environmental organization representative, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 7,
2003); confidential interview with U.S. government official, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22,
2003). See also Some Environmentalists Fault Side Deal for What it Lacks Rather than
Provisions, INT’L TRADE REP. 1506, 1506 (Sep. 15, 1993). Several government officials
involved in the NAFTA negotiations observed that the dispute resolution process was
required for political reasons, and once NAFTA was approved, it had essentially served
its’ purpose. See also Richard Kiy & John D. Wirth, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT ON NORTH AMERICA’S BORDERS (Richard Kiy & John D. Wirth eds., 1998);
Vaughan, supra note 109, at 9 (noting “the fact that sanctions and fines were thought to be
necessary to halt the highly remote chance of pollution havens from taking root underscores
the extent to which politics overshadowed any policy logic around the final environmental
deal that emerged from the tatters of the highly acrimonious trade negotiations”).
126 When CEC was established in 1993, the U.S. government committed to develop Model
Rules of Procedure. See North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Supple-
mental Agreements to the NAFTA: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
103rd Cong. (1993) (statement of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA); Exec. Order
No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25775 (May 13, 1994). In 1995 the CEC commissioned the Bar
Associations of the three countries to jointly draft the Model Rules; however, the draft rules
were never adopted. See Jay M. Vogelson, Dispute Resolution Under the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 30 INT’L L. 198, 200 (1996). The United States
attempted again in the late 1990s to develop Model Rules. See, e.g., CEC, SUMMARY REC-
ORD, SESSION 98-07 OF THE COUNCIL (Sept. 3–4, 1998), http://www.cec.org/sites/default
/files/documents/sesiones_del_consejo/2197_sr98-7e_ES.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL2J-PW
47]; CEC, SUMMARY RECORD, SESSION 99-09 OF ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIVES (1999)
(on file with author). However, these efforts were not supported by either Mexico or Canada.
At that time, very preliminary rules were drafted but still have never been finalized.
Freedom of Information Act Request HQ-RIN-00457-04 (on file with author); see also
Gary Hufbauer et al., NAFTA and the Environment Americas: Lessons for Trade Policy
(Feb. 28, 2001), http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/papers/iie/hufbauer0301-1.asp [https://
perma.cc/GK4K-DWLH]; John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with Interna-
tional Environmental Law: The Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental
Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 4–14 (2001) [hereinafter Knox, A New Approach to
Compliance with International Law]. Efforts by the United States to establish Model
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the arbitral panels,127 both of which are required to initiate the dispute
resolution process. In addition, the three governments may be subject to
a monetary penalty for failure to enforce their laws,128 but the United
States, at least, has never established guidelines to define payment of the
fines.129 Based on these acts of commission and omission, it appears that
the three countries, from the outset, had no intention of initiating the dis-
pute resolution process.130
Subsequent trade agreements negotiated by the United States af-
ter NAFTA did not include a similar onerous dispute resolution process
for the simple reason that by the time these later trade agreements con-
cluded, it was evident that conditions required to initiate the formal dis-
pute resolution process were unlikely ever to materialize, obviating the
need for an onerous process. Moreover, even if the conditions did materi-
alize, the countries could still avoid initiating the process because it was
entirely under their control.131 Thus, the argument that the effective
enforcement obligation should be moved to the NAFTA and subject to dis-
pute resolution under that agreement in order to be more effective is un-
warranted. In retrospect, the United States and its trading partners did
not need to craft an ineffective dispute resolution process within NAAEC,
and the relocation of this policy to NAFTA rather than NAAEC does not
change the fact that the countries have no basis or desire to challenge
each other’s enforcement activities.132
Rules of Procedure appeared to be driven by the interest of specific individuals in the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to maintain credibility of the process and
by pressure from environmental groups.
127 Pursuant to NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 25, the governments are required to “establish and
maintain” a roster of up to forty-five individuals to serve as panelists for an arbitral panel for
the process. To date, the three governments have never developed a roster of panelists.
128 NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 34.
129 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-01-933, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT: U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH ENVIRONMENT, LABOR, AND INVESTMENT DISPUTE SET-
TLEMENT CASES 49 (2001).
130 See, e.g., Schorr, supra note 56; HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 12; John J. Kirton, Win-
ning Together: The NAFTA Trade-Environment Record, in LINKING TRADE, supra note 90;
Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Law, supra note 126; John H.
Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor and the Environment,
26 LOY. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 359, 359–60 (2004).
131 See Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6,
at 397.
132 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 41; confidential interview with private sector represen-
tative, by telephone, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 21, 2003); confidential interview with Mexican
government official, in Mexico City, Mex. (Apr. 3, 2003); confidential interview with U.S.
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Setting aside the likelihood that the process will be used or whether
it is even needed, one concern over the use of a dispute resolution process
with recourse to sanctions is whether it is the best policy approach to ad-
dress lax enforcement of environmental laws. Some individuals argue for
eliminating the dispute resolution process entirely, as punitive measures
are unlikely to achieve the requisite strengthening of domestic enforce-
ment capacities.133 The capacity of a country to effectively enforce its laws
is intrinsically tied to its level of development and internal societal pres-
sures. While some external parties feel that coercion is necessary where
governments lack the will or resources, it is unlikely to address the root
cause of the lax enforcement. Rather, economic growth and greater soci-
etal awareness are more important drivers for environmental protection.
Thus, the emphasis on sanctioning countries to improve enforcement of
environmental law seems unnecessary, at best, and counterproductive,
at worst.
B. Ineffectiveness of Public Submission Process
The public submission process is the other mechanism established
under the NAFTA policy framework to address specific instances of lax
enforcement of environmental laws. The minimally functional process,
when employed, substantiates the legal claims of submitters and enhances
government official, by telephone, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 2003) (Relocating the effective
enforcement commitment to NAFTA rather than NAAEC would also place implementation
of the policy under the purview of the trade officials not environmental officials. While trade
officials do have more expertise in implementing dispute resolution processes, they would
be even more reluctant than environmental officials to pursue a claim related to effective
enforcement of environmental laws. Historically, trade officials have been strongly op-
posed to using trade remedies to achieve non-trade (e.g., environmental) policy objectives.
For NAFTA, trade officials largely viewed the environmental policies as the “price” for
getting the trade agreement. Their primary concern has been ensuring that environ-
mental obligations did not undermine the benefits of trade liberalization); see, e.g., Posi-
tion of USA*NAFTA on the Environmental Side Agreement to the NAFTA, in NAFTA & THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17, at 696; see, e.g., Allen, supra note 41; Schorr, supra note 56;
U.S. Groups Criticize Inaction on Peru FTA Forestry Sector Requirements, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Jun. 4, 2010) (showing the use of dispute resolution process and showing that over
time, trade officials have become more comfortable with the inclusion of environmental
policies as their locus has moved to the trade agreement, because this location allows for
a high degree of policy control). Thus, placement of the effective enforcement obligation
under NAFTA would guarantee that the process will never be used.
133 Audley & Vaughan, supra note 6.
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their credibility to pursue their claims within a broader context.134 The
process establishes a baseline for discussion and creates a compilation of
facts derived from all interested stakeholders,135 but in general, the sub-
missions process has no measurable impact on enforcement levels in the
countries. The process has been plagued with much controversy over the
years, largely due to disagreements over the respective decision-making
authorities, responsibilities, and levels of discretion of the governments
and the CEC Secretariat136 in the implementation of the process.137 Critics
describe the process as very time consuming, overly legalistic, and at odds
with the cooperative mandates of CEC.138 Despite efforts to resolve the dis-
agreements and improve implementation of the process, problems remain.
At present, the process has largely “fallen into disarray”139 and become
134 Allen, supra note 85, at 191.
135 Id. at 191.
136 According to NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 10(1)(d) (The Parties are responsible for
addressing questions and differences that may arise between the Parties regarding the
interpretation and application of the NAAEC.). Some of the specific interpretative issues
that have arisen for arts. 14 and 15 include the authority of the Council of Ministers to
narrow the scope of factual records or to determine what constitutes sufficient in-
formation to allow the Secretariat to review the submission, or the authority of the Sec-
retariat to determine the process used to gather information for a factual record or to
release information obtained during preparation of a factual record to the public without
Council approval. Closely related to the interpretative issues have been controversies
over certain government actions to delay release of information, selectively disclose in-
formation, assert that domestic enforcement action has been undertaken (which deprives
the CEC Secretariat of the authority to proceed), claims confidentiality to prevent full
disclosure, or disapproval of Secretariat’s recommendations and conclusions. See generally
ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 54; CEC JOINT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LESSONS
LEARNED, CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (2001); Jonathan Graubart, Giving Mean-
ing to New Trade-Linked “Soft Law” Agreements on Social Values: A Law-In-Action Anal-
ysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 425,
442–43 (2002); Tollefson, supra note 90, at 153–54; Hester, supra note 12, at 31–33.
137 Serena Wilson, Article 14–15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Co-
operation: Intent of the Founders, in LINKING TRADE, supra note 90, at 187; see also
Tollefson, supra note 90, at 153–54, 163–67; John H. Knox, Fixing the CEC Submissions
Procedure: Are the 2012 Revisions Up to the Task?, 7 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2014),
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss1/6 [https://perma.cc/3KG7-52UU] [here-
inafter Knox, Fixing the CEC Submissions Procedure].
138 See generally Kibel, supra note 90; Wilson, supra note 137; Victor Lichtinger, NAFTA
and the Environment: Five Years Later, in FREE TRADE, supra note 56, at 222–23;
Margaret Wilder, Border Farmers, Water Contamination, and the NAAEC Environmental
Side Accord to NAFTA, 40 NAT. RES. J. 873 (2000).
139 Hester, supra note 12, at 31.
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“hobbled by intractable conflicts of interest, a lack of compulsory power
to engage in the process, an absence of follow-up to factual records, and
cumbersome procedural and substantive requirements that dilute its
appeal to citizens and nongovernmental organizations.”140 As a result, over
the past few years, interested stakeholders rarely used the process.141
Over the years, supporters of the public submission process, in-
cluding legal scholars and environmentalists, vigilantly monitored imple-
mentation of the process and proposed numerous recommendations to
improve its effectiveness, including implementing procedural changes (e.g.,
allowing follow-up on completed factual records, defining deadlines for
taking action), safeguarding the independence of the Secretariat, and
recasting the submission process as a less formal or legalistic procedure.142
While adopting some recommendations, the CEC declined to adopt others,
especially those inhibiting the countries’ ability to exercise a high degree
of control over the process.143 Through this control, the countries main-
tain a minimally functional process, focusing on a limited number of nar-
rowly defined instances of lax enforcement. Overall, the countries’ efforts
to control the public submission process limit its potential to examine
widespread patterns of non-enforcement, which could ultimately feed into
the state-to-state dispute resolution process, discussed in Section III.A.144
140 Id. at 60.
141 As of December 2017, a total of eighty-nine public submissions had been received by
CEC (over a period of twenty-three years), and of these submissions, twenty-three factual
records had been prepared while two submissions were still active and under review.
Over the past five years, CEC has received just eleven submissions. CEC, Registry of
Submissions, http://www.cec.org/sem-submissions/registry-of-submissions [https://perma
.cc/3JCU-EKVT] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
142 See, e.g., Knox, Fixing the CEC Submissions Procedure, supra note 137; Hester, supra
note 12, at 67; see also Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 137; Knox, The Neglected Lessons
of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6, at 412 (“the CEC citizen-submissions
procedure . . . would be far more effective if it were less under government control, incorpo-
rated clear legal findings and recommendations, and led to regular institutional follow-up.”).
143 Knox, Fixing the CEC Submissions Procedure, supra note 137; Hester, supra note 12,
at 66.
144 Confidential interview with CEC Secretariat official, via telephone, Spain (Aug. 1, 2003)
(“Part 5 ‘state-to-state dispute resolution’ has contaminated the public submission process
and negotiations, the Parties are fearful that arts. 14 and 15 could lead to a Part 5 claim.”);
see also confidential interview with Canadian environmental group representative, via
telephone, British Columbia (Mar. 3, 2003) (“the Parties have tried to limit the potential
of a factual record to demonstrate a persistent pattern of non-enforcement”); Wold, supra
note 109, at 218 (“[t]he sanctions provisions cast a long shadow over the cooperative nature
of the NAAEC and arguably have made the Parties hypersensitive to the citizen submission
procedure for fear that an issue raised by a citizen could later become the subject of the
more consequential governmental sanctions process.”).
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As such, the countries are unlikely to cede or circumscribe any of their au-
thorities over the process. While the dispute resolution process can only be
initiated by the countries and they are unlikely to do so under their own
volition, it is possible they might be pressured to do so based on the out-
comes of the public submission process. Even though legal scholars provide
reasonable and detailed justifications supporting modifications to improve
implementation of the submissions process, all of which could be under-
taken without renegotiating NAAEC,145 these appeals to modify the pro-
cess based on legal reasoning alone are insufficient to foster change. The
existence and continued use of the process is driven by politics, not juris-
prudence, and the political influence of the supporters of the process di-
minished over the years.
The inclusion of the public submission process in NAAEC was a
political concession to the environmentalists when the side agreement was
negotiated.146 When the three countries crafted the submission process pro-
visions in NAAEC in 1993 (Articles 14 and 15), they could not agree on the
division of responsibilities between the governments and CEC Secretariat
for administering the process.147 As a result, NAAEC included only a gen-
eral outline of the process with ambiguous language for how it would work
in practice, leaving details of the process design for future negotiation.148
Conceptually, the process envisioned a spotlight remedy, although the coun-
tries also recognized at the time that process could be a source of input into
the state-to-state dispute resolution process if the submissions substanti-
ated the existence of persistent patterns of non-enforcement.149 As the like-
lihood of that linkage occurring increased over time, the countries sought
to constrain the implementation of the process.
145 See, e.g., John H. Knox & David L. Markell, Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures:
Lessons from an Analysis of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J.
505, 520–29 (2012); Hester, supra note 12, at 37–63.
146 Confidential interviews with two U.S. government officials, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26,
2003); confidential interview with U.S. government official, via telephone, Alexandria, VA.
(Feb. 24, 2003); confidential interview with Mexican government official, in Washington, D.C.
(Jun. 24, 2003).
147 Confidential interview with U.S. government official, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26,
2003); see also Wilson, supra note 137, at 188; Tollefson, supra note 90, at 166–67.
148 Confidential interview with U.S. government official, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 2003).
149 Confidential interview with Canadian government official, in Ottawa, ON (Feb. 10, 2003);
confidential interview with Canadian government official, in Ottawa, ON (Feb. 11, 2003);
confidential interview with environmental organization representative, in Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 7, 2003); confidential interview with US government official, in Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 24, 2003); see also Hufbauer et al., supra note 126; Robert Housman et al., Enforce-
ment of Environmental Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 593 (1993).
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Differences in interpretation of Articles 14 and 15 emerged almost
immediately when implementation of the public submission process be-
gan in 1995.150 To resolve these differences, both the CEC Secretariat and
NAFTA countries took steps to develop more detailed guidelines for the
process.151 The CEC Secretariat first developed draft guidelines in 1995,
but the countries never adopted these guidelines.152 The countries then
crafted the guidelines currently used to administer the process,153 however
these guidelines still left many aspects of the process open to interpretation
because countries could not reach consensus amongst themselves.154 Since
that time, the CEC Secretariat has interpreted various aspects of Arti-
cles 14 and 15 left unclear by the guidelines, but the countries strongly dis-
agreed with these actions.155 The countries, in turn, sought several times to
resolve the interpretative issues through revisions to the guidelines, includ-
ing in 1998, 1999, 2000, and most recently in 2012.156 However, some of
these efforts were perceived as attempts to undermine the independence of
the CEC Secretariat and the credibility of the public submission process157
150 Wilson, supra note 137, at 188; Tollefson, supra note 90, at 162; see also Marc Paquin
et al., UNISFÉRA INTERNATIONAL CTR., The Articles 14 & 15 Citizen Submission Process of the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Discussion Paper (2003).
151 Wilson, supra note 137, at 188.
152 Confidential interview with U.S. government official, via telephone, Washington, D.C.
(July 31, 2001); confidential interview with CEC Secretariat official, via telephone, Spain
(Aug. 1, 2003).
153 CEC, GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS ON ENFORCEMENT MATTERS UNDER ARTICLES 14
AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 5 (2012),
http://www3.cec.org/islandora/en/item/10838-guidelines-submissions-enforcement-mat
ters-under-articles-14-and-15-north-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR6X-8J2L]. Earlier ver-
sions of the guidelines were entitled: Bringing the Facts to Light: A Guide to Articles 14 and
15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (2007).
154 Confidential interview with U.S. government official, via telephone, Washington, D.C.
(July 31, 2001); confidential interview with Canadian government official, via telephone,
Ottawa, ON. (Mar. 3, 2003).
155 See, e.g., Tollefson, supra note 90; Kibel, supra note 90.
156 Clifford T. Cosgrove, The NAAEC after ten years: A qualitative assessment of the
North American agreement on environmental cooperation, at 63, 69 (Jun. 1, 2005) (un-
published thesis, University of Montana), https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=9664&context=etd
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180329225049/https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=9664&context=etd];
Knox, Fixing the CEC Submissions Procedure, supra note 137, at 81.
157 See, e.g., Andrea Abel, NAFTA’s North American Agreement for Environmental Coop-
eration: A Civil Society Perspective, AM. PROG. POL’Y REP. (Mar. 1, 2003); ENVTL. LAW
INST., supra note 54; Wilson, supra note 137; Tollefson, supra note 90; Kibel, supra note
90; GREENING NAFTA, supra note 85, at 275; Wold, supra note 109.
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and were strongly opposed by environmental groups; as a result, only minor
changes were adopted.158
During the ensuing years, disagreements remain among the coun-
tries, CEC Secretariat, and external stakeholders over implementation of
the public submission process. Two of the main criticisms raised about im-
plementation of the process have been: “the inherent conflict of interest
created when the Parties, as Council members, review Secretariat requests
to develop or release factual records that pertain to their own enforcement
records” and “the inability to compel a Party to comply with NAAEC’s
procedural and substantive requirements.”159 According to Knox,
The fundamental problem underlying all of these criti-
cisms is that the procedure is overseen by the same Parties
against which the submissions are directed. The Parties
control key decision points including whether to authorize
an investigation and whether to make public any resulting
report, and they have found it difficult to resist the temp-
tation to use their power over the submissions process to
delay or limit reports that might criticize their environ-
mental policies. Their efforts to protect themselves from
embarrassment have often led to counter-efforts by CEC
advisory bodies and environmental groups to defend the
independence and effectiveness of the procedure.160
Over the years, political pressure from environmental groups and
other external stakeholders safeguarded the submission process. These
groups often worked with the Joint Public Advisory Committee and na-
tional advisory committee in the United States to garner U.S. support for
the process. As such, the United States historically is the primary protec-
tor of the public submission process, with Mexico and Canada taking
more adversarial positions and seeking to influence the implementation
158 ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 54, at 29–33; Paquin et al., supra note 150, at 6–8; Tollefson,
supra note 90, at 153–54; Wilson, supra note 137, at 189–90; confidential interview with
CEC official, via telephone, Montreal, QC (Apr. 17, 2003).
159 Hester, supra note 12, at 38; see also Knox, Fixing the CEC Submissions Procedure,
supra note 137, at 82 (stating “[s]cholars and environmental advocates have increasingly
criticized the procedure on three grounds: (a) it is far too slow, (b) the Parties interfere
with it too often, and (c) the CEC does not follow-up factual records to determine whether
they have led to real improvements.”).
160 Knox, Fixing the CEC Submissions Procedure, supra note 137, at 82.
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of the process to protect their interests.161 The ability of the United
States to hold the line fluctuates depending on the political dynamics in
the United States and involvement and political influence of the environ-
mentalists. During the early years of implementation, many of the U.S.
environmental groups who advocated for the process remained actively
involved in monitoring the implementation of submission process and
continued to wield considerable political influence.162 Thus, the submis-
sion process functioned and saw great use. However, the environmental
groups have gradually seen their political influence over time wane and
with it, their influence over the public submission process.163
161 Ross E. Mitchell, Evaluating the Submission Process of the Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation of NAFTA, 15 J. ENV’T & DEV 297, at 309 (stating that “[i]n May
2000, . . . at the urging of the governments of Canada and Mexico, the Council deviated
from the Secretariats recommendations to investigate matters brought forth in two cit-
izen submissions.”); see also confidential interview with U.S. government official, in
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 2003) (“the Mexicans were always trying to limit the appli-
cability of the process”); confidential interview with Canadian government official, via
telephone, Ottawa, ON (Mar. 3, 2003) (“arts. 14 and 15 have been a source of friction be-
tween the Parties themselves, U.S. vs. Canada and Mexico. The U.S. had a different per-
ception of the process, it was more proactive”); confidential interview with U.S. government
official, in Washington, D.C. (Jun. 24, 2003) (“there was a lot of resistance to the SEM in
Mexico, it didn’t have a tradition of citizen involvement, but there was also a lot of re-
sistance by Canada as well, Canada was never proactive”); confidential interview with
CEC Secretariat official, via telephone, Spain (Aug. 1, 2003) (“The Parties tried to revise the
guidelines, but the changes were opposed by the U.S. The U.S. is the self-appointed defender
of the SEM process.”).
162 See Wold, supra note 109, at 214 (noting the impact that U.S. environmental organi-
zations had on the origination of the NAAEC environmental provisions).
163 Environmental groups from all three countries were actively involved in the political
debate over the environmental effects of NAFTA and recommended specific environ-
mental policies for inclusion in NAFTA and NAAEC, and a significant amount of their
recommendations were incorporated. After NAFTA and NAAEC entered into effect, some
environmental groups monitored the agreements implementation and actively partic-
ipated in some of the activities of the CEC, as well as served on the Joint Public Advisory
Committee and national level advisory committees in each country. These advisory com-
mittees have served as an important vehicle for transmitting input to the countries on
the NAFTA environmental policies, but as of 2017, only the U.S. national and govern-
ment level advisory committees were still active. See CEC, Advisory Committees, http://
www.cec.org/about-us/council/advisory-committees [https://perma.cc/9WT6-PM8D] (last
visited Apr. 4, 2018); TEN-YEAR REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE, TEN YEARS OF NORTH
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, at 34 (2004), http://www.cec.org/islandora
/en/item/11382-ten-years-north-american-environmental-cooperation-report-ten-year-re
view-and-assessment-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF3A-7F8E] (“[m]ore so than any NGO
could, JPAC can observe and remain up-to-date on CEC issues. Its direct access to the
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Upon its creation, the public submission process increased open-
ness and public involvement in environmental matters primarily in Mexico,
in particular for environmental groups who had limited mechanisms for
challenging their governments’ regulatory actions.164 The conflict over its
implementation has not been due to a lack of reasonable legal interpreta-
tions of NAAEC to develop functional guidelines, but rather due to dif-
fering political interests of the countries. As such, any resolution of the
interpretation and implementation issues will need to be through politi-
cal not legal means, just as in the past. The functionality of the submis-
sion process directly relates to the political power of its core constituency:
the environmentalists, and their ability to influence the United States.
As the political power of the environmentalists diminishes or the United
States ceases to act as the protector of the process for other reasons, the
process will languish, just as over the past few years.165
Council and the Secretariat helps keep the Parties . . . responsive to their constituencies
in a way that a broader, more generalized public discourse could not.”).
164 Confidential interviews with two U.S. government officials, in Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 26, 2003); confidential interview with U.S. government official, via telephone,
Alexandria, Va. (Feb. 24, 2003); confidential interview with Mexican government official,
in Washington, D.C. (Jun. 24, 2003).
165 In addition to NAFTA, there are several other trade agreements that include pro-
visions for a public submissions process that is overseen by a third party organization,
not the governments of the trading partners. None of these processes appear to be widely
used or effective. For example, under the Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental Co-
operation, which is the environmental side agreement to the Canada-Chile Free Trade
Agreement, the two countries established a public submissions process and Joint Sub-
missions Committee to review the submissions. This submissions process was modeled
directly after the process in NAAEC, arts. 14 and 15. The submission process became ac-
tive in 1997 and appears to have been functional for about ten years, during which time
a total of five public submissions were received; for four of these submissions, the Joint
Submissions Committee recommended not to develop a factual record, while for one
submission, the process was terminated early, thus the process has never produced a fac-
tual record evaluating the alleged claim of non-enforcement. The Canada-Chile public
submission process has not been used in about a decade. See Citizen submissions on Canada-
Chile environmental matters, GOV. OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-cli
mate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-countries-regions/latin-america
-caribbean/canada-chile-environmental-agreement/citizen-submission-process-com
mission/matters.html#a02-01 [https://perma.cc/KKM6-3B7N] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). Un-
der DR-CAFTA, the United States and its six trading partners similarly created a public
submissions process that is administered by the Secretariat for Central American Eco-
nomic Integration. See SECRETARIAT FOR ENFORCEMENT MATTERS, http://www.saa-sem
.org/indexEN.html [https://perma.cc/J8NG-YABF] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). Since 2006,
when the submissions process became operational, a total of thirty-six submissions have
been received; of these submissions, two submissions have resulted in the publication of
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C. Continued Conflict of Rules
Domestic environmental laws and MEA trade-related measures
can violate free trade agreement disciplines and principles under certain
circumstances, but NAFTA includes several policies directed at safe-
guarding these types of environmental measures from preemption. With
respect to MEAs, NAFTA Article 104 offers some of the strongest protec-
tion for trade-related measures of any existing regional or multilateral
trade agreement,166 but it only covers three MEAs,167 some call for expand-
ing the list of MEAs covered under this Article.168 The perceived peril
that MEAs face is highlighted by the failure of trade officials to identify
approaches to reconcile the conflict between trade rules and MEAs over
a factual record, ten submissions still active and under review or preparation of a factual rec-
ord is underway, although some of the active submissions date back to 2011. Twenty-four
submissions did not meet the criteria for preparation of a factual record or were withdrawn.
See Registro Público Casos, SECRETARIAT FOR ENFORCEMENT MATTERS, http://www.saa-sem
.org/listaCasos.html [https://perma.cc/4F2W-UKMY] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
166 Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6, at
416 (“NAFTA environmental regime has only two elements [to address a conflict of rules]:
NAFTA Article 104, which addresses potential conflicts with a limited number of envi-
ronmental agreements . . . . The first eight post-NAFTA agreements weaken these al-
ready feeble provisions. The Jordan Free Trade Agreement does not refer to the potential
conflict with multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) at all; later agreements
refer to it, but only to suggest that the parties may consult with one another about the
relationship between MEAs and trade obligations in light of the ongoing discussions at
the WTO.”); see TPP, supra note 8 (the most recent trade agreement negotiated by the
United States, TPP, provides even weaker provisions for reconciling conflicts between
trade rules and MEAs. The policy related to reconciling conflicts between trade agree-
ments and MEAs states: “[t]he Parties emphasise the need to enhance the mutual sup-
portiveness between trade and environmental law and policies, through dialogue between
the Parties on trade and environmental issues of mutual interest, particularly with re-
spect to the negotiation and implementation of relevant multilateral environmental agree-
ments and trade agreements”).
167 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104 (covering the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, and Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal). Additionally, there are also two bilateral agree-
ments covered under art. 104: The Agreement Between the Government of Canada and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Transboundary Move-
ment of Hazardous Waste and The Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area. Under art. 104(2), the Parties may add other envi-
ronmental or conservation agreement to the list.
168 Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 134.
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the past twenty years at the multilateral level.169 The WTO Committee
on Trade and Environment (“CTE”) produced no tangible guidelines to-
wards that end; rather, the deliberations under the WTO CTE “have
revealed major conflicts over the conceptualization of, and future prescrip-
tions for, trade-environment linkages in general, and on the MEA ques-
tion in particular.”170 The lack of progress appears to be due primarily to
“deep-seated differences in national interests, particularly between de-
veloped and developing countries.”171 Thus, in principle, the addition of
other MEAs to the Article 104 list seems prudent. However, in practice,
trade-related measures associated with MEAs remain unchallenged un-
der trade regime rules, and as such, the conflicts of rules may be “more
academic than real.”172
NAFTA also includes several provisions intended to protect domes-
tic environmental standards from challenge under trade agreements173
strongly influenced by the GATT arbitral panel ruling in 1991 against
U.S. restrictions on tuna imports from Mexico.174 Concerns over the ad-
equacy of these policies persist, but since the late 1990s and early 2000s,
numerous decisions by the Appellate Body of the WTO “[indicate] that it
[WTO Appellate Body] would interpret trade agreements in ways that
were less likely to run afoul of domestic and multilateral environmental
169 See, e.g., Eckersley, supra note 66; Richard Tarasofsky & Alice Palmer, The WTO in
Crisis: Lessons Learned from the Doha Negotiations on the Environment, 82 INT’L AFF. 899
(2006) (The GATT/WTO established a Committee on Trade and Environment in 1994 to
reconcile potential conflicts between trade rules and environmental laws, including
MEAs); see WTO, The Committee on Trade and Environment, https://www.wto.org/en
glish/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm [https://perma.cc/GBD5-5KBB] (last visited
Apr. 4, 2018); see also Rachel McCormick, A Qualitative Analysis of the WTO’s Role on
Trade and Environment Issues, 6 GLOB. ENVTL. POL. 102, 105–06 (2006).
170 Eckersley, supra note 66, at 46.
171 Robert Falkner & Nico Jaspers, Environmental Protection, International Trade and
the WTO, in THE ASHGATE RES. COMPANION TO INT’L TRADE POL’Y 19 (Ken Heydon &
Steven Woolcock, eds., 2012), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/538a0f32e4b0e9ab
915750a1/t/538db556e4b038f0a6eff7c4/1401795926548/Falkner_Jaspers_2012_Environ
ment_Trade_WTO_final_ms.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NFR-XP6M].
172 Tarasofsky & Palmer, supra note 169, at 903; see also Eckersley, supra note 66.
173 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2005(3) allows the NAFTA Parties to resolve disputes re-
lated to sanitary and phytosanitary measures or standards-related measures under the
substantive and procedural provisions of NAFTA rather than GATT. NAFTA, supra note
1, art. 2007. NAFTA allows the use of environmental experts in the state-to-state dispute
resolution process. NAFTA, supra note 1, at 368. Also, NAFTA provides some assurance
that environmental regulations may not be challenged as technical barriers to trade.
174 See Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 122, 127.
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rules than critics had feared.”175 Through various arbitration proceedings
that involved challenges to environmental laws, “the Appellate Body has
rejected virtually all of the reasoning of the Tuna-Dolphin panel, incorpo-
rated many of the suggestions made by environmental critics, and upheld
some of the challenged laws.”176 Thus, with respect to some domestic en-
vironmental laws, the “WTO jurisprudence has evolved significantly to
allow more domestic regulatory freedom” and “restrictions against extra-
territorial application of environmental regulations are largely make-
weights, PPM-based distinctions can be WTO-legal, and the burden of
justifying environmental regulations has shifted more onto complainants
seeking to invalidate regulations.”177 This evolution indicates that the
conflict between domestic environmental laws and trade rules today may
not be as significant as when the conflict first emerged over twenty-five
years ago.
D. Regulatory Expropriations Under the Investor-State
Dispute Settlement
The potential for NAFTA Chapter 11 to weaken implementation
of environmental regulations came to the fore after the trade agreement
entered into effect and the investor rights embodied in this chapter came
under sustained attack by environmentalists.178 Under Chapter 11 pro-
tects investors from the NAFTA countries “against potential discrimina-
tory treatment or uncompensated expropriations of investments by the host
country.”179 Investors use these protections to bring claims of expropriation
175 Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6, at 401.
176 Id.
177 Hajin Kim, Do Trade Liberalization and International Trade Law Constrain Domestic
Environmental Regulation?, 43 ENVTL. L. REV. 10823, 10831 (2013).
178 See, e.g., QUENTIN KARPILOW ET AL., NAFTA: 20 YEARS OF COSTS TO COMMUNITIES AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (2014), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/NAFTAReport.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/H3BV-DYUB]; see also U.S. Environmental Groups Urge Inclusion of Lacey Act
Language in TPP, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Jun. 4, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Environmental Groups
Urge Inclusion] (“[t]he [environmental] groups also reiterated their arguments that the
Obama administration should . . . dramatically scale back the ability of private entities
to challenge governments through an investor-state arbitration mechanism. . . . Envi-
ronmental groups worry that investor-state arbitration presents a threat to the ability
of governments to regulate in the public interest, because those regulations could become
subject to legal challenges brought by private entities under the FTA.”).
179 Gaines, supra note 77, at 1; NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110 (“No Party may directly
or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in
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when host countries take actions to implement or enforce environmental
laws, resulting in regulatory expropriations or “takings.”180 These success-
ful rulings not only require compensation from the host country, but also
have the potential to undermine enforcement or enactment of environ-
mental laws for fear that investors will claim a regulatory expropriation
and seek compensation in the future.181
Recommendations for limiting the potential for investors to claim
regulatory expropriations range from revision of the investor rights to
complete elimination of Chapter 11.182 Although the potential for Chap-
ter 11 to be used for regulatory expropriation was unforeseen, since it has
emerged, the U.S. government has modified the investor protection provi-
sions within the most recent trade agreement it negotiated, TPP, to limit
the scope for expropriation.183 The modification to TPP provisions vali-
date the concerns raised about use of the investor protections to under-
mine domestic environmental laws, and thus justify similar revisions to
NAFTA. However, it is possible that the potential to undermine domestic
environmental laws is not as great as envisioned. Earlier rulings for “reg-
ulatory expropriation” cases, such as Metalclad Corporation v. United
Mexican States, “adopted a broad standard that, if taken literally, would
its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment (‘expropriation’), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory
basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment
of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.”).
180 Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6, at
402–03, 417.
181 See, e.g., Christopher Oliver, The Treadmill of Production Under NAFTA, 18 ORG. &
DEV. 55 (2005).
182 COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, supra note 79, at 4, 12.
183 TPP, supra note 8, art. 9.8 (“No Party shall expropriate or nationalise a covered invest-
ment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or na-
tionalisation (expropriation), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory
manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in accordance
with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4; and (d) in accordance with due process of law”); NAFTA, supra
note 1, art. 1110 (showing that the key difference between TPP and NAFTA is replace-
ment of the statement “take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation”
with “measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.” The changes seeks to
eliminate the problematic interpretation of the phrase “tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation.”); Sanford Gaines, Methanex Corp. v. United States, 100 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 683,
684–85 (2006) (“The vexing interpretive question in Article 1110 is whether the phrase
‘tantamount to expropriation’ merely clarifies the right to compensation for indirect
expropriations, or whether it creates a broader right for compensation for measures with
lesser effect on the investment.”).
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mean that almost any regulation that significantly restricts the use of prop-
erty would be an expropriation.”184 However, “a later tribunal adopted a
standard much more protective of nondiscriminatory regulation,”185 indi-
cating that the arbitral panels are giving more careful consideration to
the merits and context of the claims.
Based on a review of several regulatory expropriation cases in-
volving environmental measures under NAFTA Chapter 11, Gaines de-
termined that “[t]he facts of the cases and developments subsequently
indicate that the government actions in the first three cases were not
truly environmental protection measures, but were motivated by local
political and economic considerations. The fourth claim, which involved
a bona fide environmental protection, was rightly rejected.”186 Thus,
rulings under Chapter 11 related to regulatory expropriation due to envi-
ronmental laws do not appear to be targeting legitimate regulations.
Nonetheless, some “critics remain concerned that environmental and
other social regulations are at risk of successful challenge under the in-
vestment provisions in NAFTA and later agreements.”187 However, Gaines
argues that “environmentalists have little ground for alarm, and much
reason to be encouraged, about how Chapter 11 has influenced environ-
mental protection.”188
E. Underfunding of CEC
The overarching mandate of NAAEC is to promote environmental
cooperation to strengthen environmental management and protection in
North America to counter the scale and sectoral effects of trade liberal-
ization under NAFTA. Since NAFTA entered into effect, CEC has imple-
mented a broad range of environmental cooperative initiatives between
the United States, Mexico, and Canada.189 The overall funding for these
initiatives has generally been considered inadequate, given the size of the
184 Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6, at 402.
185 Id.
186 Gaines, supra note 77, at 171.
187 Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, supra note 6, at
402–03.
188 Gaines, supra note 77, at 171; see also Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 11, 136.
189 See Allen, supra note 85, at 137–38; GREENING NAFTA, supra note 85, at 25–26;
COMM. FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, STRATEGIC PLAN 2015–2020 at 1 (July 15, 2015), http://
www.cec.org/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_plans/strategic_plan_2015_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4YSD-VXT6].
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economies of the three countries, and the actual impacts of these cooper-
ative efforts on environmental management has been trivial. As such,
there have been continued calls to increase funding for the cooperative
programs. However, there is little evidence that the environmental con-
ditions in any of the countries has deteriorated due to changes in levels
or location of economic activities under NAFTA. As was discussed under
Section III.A, NAFTA has not given rise to pollution havens, fostered
greater environmental degradation in Mexico, or weakened environmen-
tal management in the NAFTA countries. Some supporters of NAAEC
have argued that the side agreement is still useful for advancing sustain-
able development within North America, providing a general forum for
hemispheric environmental cooperation unrelated to NAFTA, or enhanc-
ing environmental governance.190 Numerous government officials involved
in negotiation of NAAEC envisioned that the cooperative mandate of
NAAEC would be the mandate to endure over the long term and would
be used to the extent needed by the countries, and that is largely how it
has played out.191 Environmental policy problems vary in magnitude and
scope across the hemisphere and CEC provides a governance structure
that allows countries to collectively decide what problems they will work
on, when, and in what manner. As a general forum for hemispheric envi-
ronmental cooperation, CEC is most useful for problems that are truly
hemispheric in scope. However, as a forum for building institutional ca-
pacity to address the environmental effects of NAFTA, it is neither ef-
fective nor needed any longer.
F. Absence of “Emerging” Environmental Concerns
Within the past decade, a new criticism of the NAFTA environ-
mental policies has been that they do not address emerging environmen-
tal concerns, such as illegal exploitation of and trade in natural resources
or the fulfillment of obligations under MEAs, concerns that featured prom-
inently in the negotiation of environmental policies for TPP.192 When
190 See, e.g., Esty & Salzman, supra note 15, at 11, 136.
191 See Allen, supra note 41, at 321; see also confidential interview with U.S. government
official, in Washington, DC (Feb. 24, 2003); confidential interview with U.S. government
official, in Washington, DC (Feb. 26, 2003); confidential interview with Canadian govern-
ment official, in Ottawa, ON (Feb. 12, 2003).
192 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Trade Facts: Bipartisan Agree-
ment on Trade Policy at 2 (2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets
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NAFTA was negotiated over twenty-five years ago, the major environ-
mental concerns at the time were a range of hypothetical effects of trade
liberalization such as industry flight, pollution havens, downward har-
monization, and conflicts between environmental laws and trade regime
rules.193 However, these hypothetical effects never materialized, and en-
vironmentalists shifted their focus to a narrower set of specific environ-
mental concerns that may not be linked directly to trade liberalization
but still require urgent attention from the international community.194
While these concerns are new to the trade policy domain, they are not new
to the environmental policy domain. In fact, they have been the focus of
global efforts for many years. Moreover, the broad mandate of NAAEC
allows the NAFTA countries to work on these policy issues on a coopera-
tive basis. Thus, the lack of focus on these issues in NAFTA should not
be viewed necessarily as a shortcoming.
Regardless, environmentalists have sought binding, enforceable
commitments in newer trade agreements on these emerging concerns. For
example, environmentalists pressed for inclusion of enforceable policies
to reduce overfishing, and illegal trade in wildlife and timber in TPP,195
even though the extent to which these problems were present in the TPP
countries varied and they were not likely to worsen solely due to TPP.196
The overexploitation of these natural resources is a serious, long-standing
/2007/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf [https://perma.cc/W29W-KWGC]; OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, USTR Green Paper on Conservation and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (2011), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2011
/ustr-green-paper-conservation-and-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/PRC6-GX
U4] [hereinafter USTR Green Paper]; U.S. Environmental Groups Urge Inclusion, supra
note 178; Addressing conservation challenges in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(2013) [hereinafter Addressing conservation challenges]; Letter from 24 Nongovernmental
Organizations to USTR Michael Froman (Nov. 26, 2013), http://nffc.net/wp-content/up
loads/2013/03/Letter-on-G33-Proposal-US-groups-Nov-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG4A-9F
45]; Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S.
Finance Committee (2014).
193 AUDLEY, supra note 4.
194 Environmental Groups Laud New Peru Language as First Step, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(Jun. 29, 2007).
195 U.S. Environmental Groups Urge Inclusion, supra note 178; U.S. Tables Parts of TPP
Environmental Text on Conservation Issues, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Apr. 1, 2011); Addressing
conservation challenges, supra note 192; USTR Green Paper, supra note 192.
196 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement; Interim En-
vironmental Review ii (2013), http://www.ustr.gov/federal-register-notices/trans-pacific
-partnership-agreement-interim-environmental-review [https://perma.cc/9PUP-22VV] [here-
inafter OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement].
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global problem that has not been dealt with effectively in existing fora.197
Overfishing has been a problem for many years, with over 60 percent of
fishing stocks fully exploited or depleted,198 but regional management au-
thorities have not been able to stem the decimation. Likewise, illegal
trade in wildlife has been addressed on a limited basis under MEAs such
CITES,199 while trade in illegally logged timber200 has been particularly
challenging to address.201 Environmentalists have also pressed for en-
forceable policies to ensure fulfillment of obligations under certain MEAs,
something that many developing countries have struggled to achieve. Over-
all, there is considerable merit to addressing these environmental prob-
lems, and despite the long-standing efforts to do so at the international
level, trade agreements provide another vehicle for making progress. More-
over, by shifting their focus to more politically salient, tangible, or highly
visible environmental problems, environmentalists are able to regain
some influence within the trade policy domain.
Inclusion of these new policies within NAFTA, as well as other
trade agreements, however, has several potential negative repercussions
that must be weighed against the positive benefits that may arise from
these policies.202 First, policies related to management of natural re-
sources within countries have implications for infringement of state sov-
ereignty. The implementation of similar policies for management of the
forest sector under the U.S.-Peru free trade agreement provides an ex-
tremely cautionary lesson that stronger enforceable commitments are not
easily implemented and can have unintended consequences that may
undermine domestic political processes.203 Inclusion of these types of 
197 See, e.g., USTR Green Paper, supra note 192.
198 See, e.g., FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE
2008 (2009), http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0250e/i0250e00.htm [https://perma.cc/CEM4
-7CYY]; Steven A. Murawski, Rebuilding depleted fish stocks: The good, the bad, and,
mostly, the ugly, 67 ICES J. OF MARINE SCI. 1830, 1832, 1835–36 (2010).
199 Stephanie Eberhardt, The Lacey Act Amendments and United States’ policing of in-
ternational trade, 35 HOUSTON J. OF INT’L L. 397, 415 (2013).
200 Ryan Villarreal, Interpol Launches Crackdown on Global Timber Trafficking In Latin
America, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.illegal-logging.info/content/interpol
-launches-crackdown-global-timber-trafficking-latin-america [https://perma.cc/QE2Y-UFQ5].
201 See, e.g., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Not as easy as falling off a log: The illegal logging trade
in the Asia-Pacific Region and possible mitigation strategies V (Foreign Pol’y at Brookings,
Working Paper No. 5, Mar. 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/research/not-as-easy-as-fall
ing-off-a-log-the-illegal-logging-trade-in-the-asia-pacific-region-and-possible-mitigation
-strategies/ [https://perma.cc/9YV9-G4TX].
202 See Allen, supra note 15, at 50–51 (a more detailed discussion of these repercussions).
203 The forest sector commitments under the U.S.-Peru free trade agreement required
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environmental policies in trade agreements may also undermine the
substantial changes to domestic laws and institutions within eighteen months after the
trade agreement took effect, which was in Apr. 2006. In order to implement the forest sec-
tor commitments within that time frame, the Peruvian president was granted extraor-
dinary powers in 2008 to unilaterally enact legislation, but these power was severely
abused, resulting in laws without adequate public or political consultation that weakened
the existing levels of protection of forest resources in the country. See, e.g., Sikina Jinnah,
Strategic Linkages: The Evolving Role of Trade Agreements in Global Environmental Gov-
ernance, 20 J. OF ENV’T & DEV. 191, 192–93, 207 (2011) (The forest sector policies created
“perverse incentives for the Peruvian government to subvert standard national reg-
ulatory developed channels”); Neil Hughes, Indigenous protest in Peru: The ‘Orchard Dog’
bites back, 9 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 85 (2010); see ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, Peru’s
forest sector: Ready for the new international landscape? (2010), http://www.illegal-log
ging.info/content/perus-forest-sector-ready-new-international-landscape [https://perma
.cc/F3FK-A3YL] (violent protests over the laws by indigenous groups resulted in the
deaths of at least thirty Peruvians. See, e.g., Peru Says it is Complying with Small Frac-
tion of FTA Forestry Obligations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sep. 20, 2010); U.S. ‘Monitoring
Situation’ after Peru Fails to Act on New Forestry Law, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Dec. 24,
2010); U.S. Has No Solid Timeline For Peru To Comply With FTA Forestry Annex, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (May 6, 2011); Press Release, Office of the USTR, The United States and
Peru Reach Agreement on Action Plan to Strengthen Forest Sector Governance (Jan. 11,
2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/january/us-peru-ac
tion-plan-forest-sector-governance [https://perma.cc/8AKW-9W84]; Peruvian Documents
on Forestry Annex Show Commitments Not Fully Met, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 2, 2015);
USTR Comes Under Fire for Weak Oversight of Peru FTA Logging Rules, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (June 12, 2015); U.S. Meets with New Peruvian Administration to Discuss Illegal
Logging Issues, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 18, 2016) (showing that implementation of the
forest sector commitments has been arduous, resource intensive, and time-consuming
process). See USTR, in ‘Unprecedented’ Action, Orders Halt of Peruvian Timber Imports,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 27, 2017) (to support implementation of the commitments, the
United States provided full-time staff with expertise in forestry management along with
$60 million in assistance. Although some progress has been made, in 2017, the United
States halted shipments of some timber imports due to possible illegal harvesting. Ac-
cording to USTR, “[w]hile the Forest Annex has catalyzed meaningful reforms in Peru’s
forestry sector, the verification process last year highlighted the systemic challenges that
remain in combating illegal logging in Peru.”); see Interagency Committee on Trade in
Timber Products from Peru, Statement Regarding July 2016 Timber Verification Report
from Peru 4 (Aug. 17, 2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/IssueAreas/Environment
/Timber%20Committee%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L27W-TDFF]; see also USTR,
UNITED STATES-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT: STRENGTHENING FOREST SECTOR
GOVERNANCE IN PERU (2013), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013-Progress-under
-the-Forest-Annex.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSS6-VVNU]; United States-Peru Environmental
Cooperation Work Program (2015–2018). The U.S. interagency committee that reviewed
the documentation on illegal timber shipments acknowledged that challenges remain for
Peru to implement its obligations under the trade agreement, “[t]he bilateral action plan
and other recent efforts spurred additional progress in Peru’s governance of its forestry
sector. . . . However, complex challenges remain that will require continued, vigilant en-
gagement, attention, and collaboration. This verification process highlighted, in partic-
ular, ongoing challenges to ensuring timely enforcement.
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general credibility and effectiveness of the multilateral system for man-
aging environmental issues,204 create differential environmental policy
obligations on trading partners,205 create enforceable obligations that re-
quire substantial funding allocations and assistance that may never ma-
terialize, and place important MEA or other environmental commitments
under the purview of non-environmental government agencies that may
not have the expertise or inclination to ensure effective implementation
of obligations.206 Thus, while the environmental concerns raised more
recently by environmentalists all have merit and require immediate ac-
tion, the inclusion of enforceable policies within a regional trade agree-
ment to address them should be given careful consideration.
G. Summary of Rhetoric vs. Reality
Although the environmental policies included under NAFTA are
some of the most far-reaching and robust of any existing trade agree-
ment,207 these policies have been the subject to ongoing criticisms over
the years with accompanying calls for their renegotiation. Major criticisms
of the policies include the inadequacy of the two mechanisms established
to ensure effective enforcement of environmental laws, insufficient pro-
tections of MEAs and domestic environmental laws from preemption by
trade regime rules, use of investor rights under NAFTA Chapter 11 to
claim regulatory expropriations, underfunding of the CEC, and the ab-
sence of enforceable policies to reduce overexploitation or illegal trade in
natural resources, or fulfill MEA obligations. Based on a detailed review
of these criticisms, the rhetoric for modifying the policies is not supported
by the reality.
The commitment to effectively enforce environmental laws and
associated state-to-state dispute resolution process and public submis-
sion process have not had measurable impact on enforcement activities
by the NAFTA countries, and arguments have been made to modify both
processes. The state-to-state dispute resolution process has never been
invoked because the conditions that trigger the process have not ma-
terialized; however, the countries would be loath to initiate the process
even if the conditions did materialize. Incorporating the commitment for
204 See, e.g., Jinnah, supra note 203.
205 See, e.g., U.S. TPP Environment Proposal Follows ‘May 10’, But May Have Different
Effects, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 18, 2011).
206 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 85 (for NAFTA environmental policies).
207 OECD, supra note 26.
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effective enforcement into the NAFTA itself will not change the fact that
the countries have no basis or desire to challenge each other’s enforce-
ment activities. The implementation of the public submission process, the
other mechanism established for ensuring effective enforcement, has been
problematic due to resistance from Mexico and Canada. However, overcom-
ing this resistance depends on the political power of its core constituency,
the environmentalists, and their ability to influence the United States, not
on the power of legal reasoning. Given the general decline of saliency
these concerns over the years,208 it is unlikely that environmentalists will
have the political power to return the public submission process to a fully
functional level.
NAFTA includes some of the most robust provisions for protection
for MEA trade-related measures and domestic environmental regulations
and standards against challenge by trade rules; however, the conflicts be-
tween these two policy domains appear to be “more academic than real.”
Challenges to MEAs have never occurred while challenges to domestic
regulations have increasingly seen favorable rulings in support of the en-
vironmental measures. The potential use of the investor rights provided
under NAFTA Chapter 11 to undermine implementation of domestic en-
vironmental laws was unforeseen. However arbitral rulings to date do not
appear to target legitimate environmental regulations, only those that
are protectionists in nature. Even so, as a precaution, minor modifications
to the policy language are warranted, as was done for TPP.
The limited funding provided to CEC constrains the scope and level
of environmental cooperative activities that can be undertaken, thereby
limiting its ability to build institutional capacity in the NAFTA countries,
and in particular Mexico. However, the institutional capacity of Mexico to
protect the environment has improved markedly over the years in response
to many factors, and CEC’s contribution has been trivial. CEC has been
and will remain predominantly a forum for addressing hemispheric envi-
ronmental issues, but only if it is the most convenient and effective means
of doing so. Increasing funding levels does not change the fact that CEC is
a demand driven institution. Lastly, the concerns over overexploitation or
illegal trade in natural resources or fulfillment of MEA obligations are
valid, but are probably best addressed in multilateral fora. Overall, there
is very little justification for renegotiating the NAFTA environmental
policies, and in fact, what is really needed is a critical reassessment of the
basis for including these policies in future trade agreements at all.
208 See, e.g., Pauline Abetti, Congressional voting on DR-CAFTA: The ineffectiveness of
environmental lobbying, 11 J. OF ECON. POL’Y REFORM 11, 11–12 (Mar. 2008).
1012 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:965
IV. RENEGOTIATION OF NAFTA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES UNDER
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
During the presidential campaign in 2016, candidate Trump heavily
criticized NAFTA over its impacts on jobs in the United States.209 and once
in office, made the decision to renegotiate the trade agreement, including
its environmental policies. Towards that end, the Trump administration
has developed a specific list of renegotiation objectives for the environment,
which are summarized in Table 2. In general, these objectives appear to
be crafted to address the common criticisms leveled against the NAFTA
environmental policies, with one exception as discussed below. Moreover,
many of these provisions seem directed at bringing the NAFTA environ-
mental policies in line with the policies in other U.S. trade agreements ne-
gotiated since NAFTA over the past 25 years. However, as the analysis
in Part III highlights, there is very little justification for renegotiating
these policies and the following provides a critique of the Trump admin-
istration renegotiation objectives in light of the preceding analysis.
TABLE 2: ENVIRONMENTAL RENEGOTIATION OBJECTIVES FOR NAFTA
No.
Trump Administration NAFTA Renegotiating 
Objectives
Reference to Existing
NAFTA/NAAEC 
Policy
1
Bring the environment provisions into the core of the Agree-
ment rather than in a side agreement.
NAAEC, Parts 1, 2, 3,
4, and 5
2
Establish strong and enforceable environment obligations
that are subject to the same dispute settlement mechanism
that applies to other enforceable obligations of the
Agreement.
NAAEC Part 2, Art. 5
and Part 5
3
Establish rules that will ensure that NAFTA countries do
not waive or derogate from the protections afforded in their
environmental laws for purposes of encouraging trade or
investment.
NAFTA Art. 1114
4
Establish rules that will ensure that NAFTA countries do
not fail to effectively enforce their environment laws
through a sustained or recurring course of action or
inaction, in a manner affecting trade or investment
between the parties.
NAAEC Part 2, Art. 5
and Part 5
209 See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Donald Trump Says NAFTA Was the Worst Trade Deal the
U.S. Ever Signed, FORTUNE (Sep. 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/27/presidential
-debate-nafta-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/P2MT-DF9E].
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No.
Trump Administration NAFTA Renegotiating 
Objectives
Reference to Existing
NAFTA/NAAEC 
Policy
5
Require NAFTA countries to adopt and maintain measures
implementing their obligations under select Multilateral
Environment Agreements (MEAs) to which the NAFTA
countries are full parties, including the Convention on In-
ternational Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora.
Not explicitly covered
under NAFTA policy
framework, but could
fall under cooperative
mandate of NAAEC
6
Establish a means for stakeholder participation, including
commitments for public advisory committees, and a process
for the public to raise concerns directly with its government
if they believe it is not meeting its environment
commitments.
NAAEC, Part 2, Art. 6,
and Part 3, Arts. 16,
17, and 18
7
Require NAFTA countries to ensure access to fair, equitable
and transparent administrative and judicial proceedings for
enforcing their environmental laws, and provide appropri-
ate sanctions or remedies for violations of their environmen-
tal laws.
NAAEC, Part 2, Arts. 6
and 7
8
Provide for a framework for conducting, reviewing, and
evaluating cooperative activities that support implementa-
tion of the environment commitments, and for public partic-
ipation in these activities.
NAAEC, Part 2
9
Establish or maintain a senior-level Environment Commit-
tee, which will meet regularly to oversee implementation of
environment commitments, with opportunities for public
participation in the process.
NAAEC, Part 3, Art. 9
10
Combat illegal fishing, unreported, and unregulated (“IUU”)
including by implementing port state measures and sup-
porting increased monitoring and surveillance.
Not explicitly covered
under NAFTA policy
framework, but could
fall under cooperative
mandate of NAAEC
11
Establish rules to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies, such
as those that contribute to overfishing and IUU fishing, and
pursue transparency in fisheries subsidies programs.
Not explicitly covered
under NAFTA policy
framework, but could
fall under cooperative
mandate of NAAEC
12
Promote sustainable fisheries management and long-term
conservation of marine species, including sharks, sea tur-
tles, seabirds and marine mammals.
Not explicitly covered
under NAFTA policy
framework, but could
fall under cooperative
mandate of NAAEC
13
Protect and conserve flora and fauna and ecosystems, in-
cluding through action by countries to combat wildlife and
timber trafficking.
Not explicitly covered
under NAFTA policy
framework, but could
fall under cooperative
mandate of NAAEC
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Renegotiation objective 1 would likely eliminate NAAEC entirely
or drastically reduce its remit by subsuming specific environmental pol-
icies from the side agreement into NAFTA. Obviously, none of the long-
standing criticisms of the NAFTA environmental policies has ever called
for abrogation of NAAEC. However, eliminating and moving the environ-
mental provisions of NAAEC into the core of NAFTA would bring NAFTA
into line with all other U.S. trade agreements, for which the majority of
environmental provisions are included in the trade agreements rather
than the environmental side agreements.210 As a practical matter, given
the limited effect that the NAAEC has had on environmental protection
in North America, it is hard to justify retaining the side agreement, with
its extensive institutional structures, unless it can be transformed into
or recast as an trilateral institution completely unrelated to NAFTA with
a mandate that is fully supported by the NAFTA countries.211
Renegotiation objectives 2 and 4 pertain to relocating the commit-
ment to effectively enforce environmental laws from NAAEC to NAFTA
210 See Allen, supra note 15 (comparison of environmental provisions of U.S. free trade agree-
ments since NAFTA. All U.S. trade agreements since NAFTA have had an accompanying
environmental side agreement. However, these side agreements included a smaller, and
sometimes weaker, set of environmental provisions, as well as more minimalist insti-
tutional structures compared to NAAEC. NAAEC included the most comprehensive and
ambitious set of environmental provisions and robust institutional arrangement for any
U.S. free trade agreement).
211 The United States, Mexico, and Canada have long recognized their ecological interde-
pendence due to shared ecosystems on the North American continent and over the years
have established numerous bilateral, and to a lesser extent, trilateral environmental
institutions to facilitate joint action on specific environmental issues of common concern.
See Don Munton & John Kirton, North American Environmental Cooperation: Bilateral,
Trilateral, Multilateral, 4 NORTH AMERICAN OUTLOOK (1994); Alberto Szekely, Estab-
lishing a Region for Ecological Cooperation in North America, in MAKING FREE TRADE
WORK IN THE AMERICAS (Boris Kozolchyk, ed., 1993); Roberto Sanchez-Rodriguez et al.,
The Dynamics of Transboundary Environmental Agreements in North America, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ON NORTH AMERICA’S BORDERS, supra note 125, at 33–34. Not-
withstanding these past efforts, the three countries never established a regional body for
broad-based environmental cooperation until the NAFTA negotiations, despite some calls
to do so. See Mary Kelly, Carbón I/II: an unresolved binational challenge, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL MANAGEMENT ON NORTH AMERICA’S BORDERS, supra note 125, at 189, 199–201;
Konrad von Moltke, NAAEC and The North American Environment, in SHAPING CON-
SENSUS, supra note 42, at 20–21. The transfer of all the environmental provisions of
NAAEC to NAFTA would signify that the provisions are only relevant for the trade con-
text, and do not have any value independent of the trade agreement. However, NAAEC
and CEC have often been viewed as viable outside of the trade context; in other words,
their existence could be justified without NAFTA. If NAAEC and CEC are to remain vi-
able, that independent value must be made readily apparent.
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and subjecting breaches of this commitment to the trade agreement’s own
state-to-state dispute resolution process. As was discussed in Part III,
there is no justification for moving this commitment to NAFTA, and in
fact, the entire commitment could be eliminated entirely, it is for all practi-
cal purposes a paper tiger. Renegotiation objective 3 is already included
in NAFTA and this policy does not appear to need strengthening. There
has never been an instance of a NAFTA country rolling back its environ-
mental regulations or enforcement levels to encourage trade, and this
concern is no longer even raised by environmentalists in the context of
trade policy negotiations.
Renegotiation objectives 5, 10, 11, 12, and 13 pertain to the inclu-
sion of emerging environmental concerns that have been advanced by
environmentalists over the past decade and were included in TPP. Given
that the United States, Mexico, and Canada have already negotiated spe-
cific environmental policies to address these issues in TPP, as a practical
matter, the three countries should have no reservations over including
similar policies under NAFTA. However, as discussed in Part III, the merits
of incorporating these policies into a regional free trade agreement
should be given careful consideration. Undoubtedly, the concerns are valid
and need urgent attention by the international community, but subordi-
nating international environmental policy to a free trade agreement may
not be prudent.
Renegotiation objective 6 reflects a long-standing environmental
provision that has been included in all other U.S. free trade agreements.
This objective requires establishment of a domestic advisory body for pro-
viding recommendations, similar to the national advisory committee
under NAAEC, however, this provision would also likely serve as a sub-
stitute for establishment of the more robust Joint Public Advisory Com-
mittee under NAAEC. Moreover, the objective would create an even weaker
process for public complaints than the public submissions process under
NAAEC. Seven U.S. free trade agreements included similar provisions
that allow for submittal of complaints directly to the government rather
than via a submission process administered by a third party external to
the national governments.212 The operation and effectiveness of these do-
mestic processes has not been reviewed in the literature.
Renegotiation objective 7 merely relocates an environmental policy
related to establishment of judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative pro-
ceedings and access to remedies from NAAEC to NAFTA. This commitment
212 See Allen, supra note 15, at 47–53.
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is tied to the concern over lax enforcement that was a central concern for
NAFTA. While the widespread patterns of non-enforcement envisioned
with NAFTA have not materialized, any credible democracy should provide
its citizens with procedural guarantees and access to remedies to ensure
enforcement of environmental laws within the domestic context. Similar
guarantees have been included in all other U.S. free trade agreements,213
however, the environmental provision is non-enforceable. As such, it seems
a bit of a stretch to believe that including a non-enforceable provision in
a regional trade agreement will have more force in bringing about these
types of domestic policy changes than the weight of history and long-
standing democratic traditions of the NAFTA countries.
Lastly, renegotiation objectives 8 and 9 capture the central coop-
erative mandate of NAAEC and require the establishment of some basic
institutional structure for overseeing the implementation of cooperative
activities. All other U.S. free trade agreements include some provisions
for pursuing environmental cooperation, but often in conjunction with an
environmental side agreement, with the cooperative activities being un-
dertaken primary under the auspices of the side agreement.214 However,
the phrasing of objective 8, with no mention of a corresponding side agree-
ment, indicates that NAFTA will be the governing agreement for environ-
mental cooperation. The proposed senior-level oversight body is consistent
with other U.S. free trade agreements, but would be much less robust
than the existing CEC Secretariat.215
Overall, the Trump administration’s negotiation objectives for the
NAFTA environmental policies seemed geared towards bringing the pol-
icies in line with those of other U.S. trade agreements while addressing
common criticisms leveled against the trade agreement. For the other
U.S. trade agreements, all of the core environmental provisions are lo-
cated within the trade agreement, including the key provisions related
to effective enforcement of environmental laws, non-derogation of laws,
and procedural guarantees. All other U.S. trade agreements also have
accompanying environmental side agreements, but they are much less
robust than NAAEC and solely focused on promoting voluntary environ-
mental cooperation. At first glance, it appears that the renegotiation of
NAFTA environmental policies may result in the complete elimination
of NAAEC, or at a minimum, a significant reduction in its remit. However,
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 See id.
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the central thrust of the renegotiations objectives is that they merely
move policies from one legal instrument to another without giving any
consideration to the merit of policies themselves. The analysis in Part III
demonstrates that many of these policies are no longer needed, as they
address problems that are more academic or imagined than real. As such,
moving the policies from one place to another is akin to rearranging the
chairs on the deck of the Titanic.
CONCLUSIONS
The NAFTA environmental policies have been and continue to be
a source of contention for activists and policymakers alike, giving rise to
periodic bouts of environment and trade policy debate redux. The per-
ceived shortcomings of the policies and attendant improvements are well-
known. However, with few minor exceptions, the rhetoric supporting
policy changes does not match the reality. The NAFTA environmental
policies were crafted at a time when there was a rudimentary understand-
ing of the nexus between trade and environment policies. Extensive scru-
tiny of the environmental policies over the years has confirmed that the
adverse environmental effects of NAFTA have not materialized, and as
such, the policies are largely unneeded. Thus, rather than continue to rep-
licate or reshuffle policies merely to achieve some academic sense of con-
sistency across U.S. trade agreements, as is being done now by the Trump
administration as it renegotiates NAFTA, what is needed is a critical
assessment of the overall policy approach used by the United States to
integrate environmental and trade policies.
Over the past 25 years, the United States has used a standard ap-
proach to integrating environmental policy concerns into its trade policy.
This approach consists of including a portfolio of similar environmental
policies in each trade agreement that deal with a broad range of issues
while allowing for some minor variation depending on the level of devel-
opment and environmental conditions of its trading partners.216 Most of
the environmental policies are legacy policies, first included under NAFTA
and carried forward and modified slightly over time.217 While these policies
have been sufficient to ensure legislative approval of the trade agreements,
the policies are largely based on past precedent rather than empirically
grounded. The time has come to take a hard look at U.S. efforts to integrate
216 See generally id.
217 See generally id.
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environmental and trade policy, and the following summarizes a general
reassessment of the current policy approach for U.S. trade agreements.
A. Identify Bona Fide Trade-Related Environmental
Policy Priorities
The paramount question that needs to be asked is whether envi-
ronmental policies are really needed within trade agreements, and the
answer to that question depends on the potential environmental effects
that arise when trade is liberalized. Obviously, this question has been at
the center of the trade and environmental debate for three decades but
definitive answers remain elusive. Research indicates that it is very dif-
ficult to identify or predict specific environmental effects of trade liberal-
ization ex ante. As was discussed in Part I, there may be “legal” effects
of trade liberalization, due to differences in the stringency of environmental
laws and levels of enforcement between trading partners or due to a con-
flict between trade regime rules and environmental laws; these legal
effects may hypothetically occur for any free trade agreement. There also
may be “sectoral,” “scale,” or “product” effects of trade liberalization due
to changes in the pattern and magnitude of trade flows when specific
economic sectors are liberalized, and these effects are highly variable
depending on the substantive content of the trade agreement.
Historically, the United States has sought to identify these vari-
ous types of environmental effects by completing an environmental im-
pact assessment of its proposed free trade agreements.218 However, these
reviews are focused only on environmental impacts within the United
States.219 To date, environmental reviews completed by the United States
have not identified any significant environmental effects of any trade
agreements for the U.S. territory.220 Identifying the potential environ-
mental impacts of U.S. trade agreements in the territories of the trading
218 See Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, Exec. Order No. 13141, 64 Fed. Reg.
63,169 (Nov. 18, 1999); Guidelines for Implementation of Executive Order 13141, 65 Fed.
Reg. 79,442 (Dec. 19, 2000) (Under Exec. Order 13141, “[e]nvironmental reviews are an
important tool to help identify potential environmental effects of trade agreements, both
positive and negative, and to help facilitate consideration of appropriate responses to
those effects whether in the course of negotiations, through other means, or both.”).
219 Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, Exec. Order 13141, supra note 218 (these
reviews can be used to examine global and transboundary impacts too).
220 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., Environmental Reviews, https://ustr.gov/issue
-areas/environment/environmental-reviews [https://perma.cc/FK8P-PTYB] (last visited
Apr. 4, 2018).
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partners is the responsibility of each country. Although sometimes the
other countries do complete their own environmental reviews and release
the results to the public,221 more often they do not and the United States
has no authority to compel them to do so. Thus, the United States gener-
ally lacks a solid analytical basis to craft specific environmental policies
for its trade agreements.
The more general academic literature on the environmental ef-
fects of liberalized trade likewise offers little guidance for crafting spe-
cific environmental policies for trade agreements. The crux of the problem
is that trade agreements in themselves do not cause direct and immedi-
ate environmental damage;222 rather environmental effects arise when
economic activities associated with freer trade exacerbate unmitigated
market or government failures.223 As Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu note:
[t]he environmental outcome of trade and investment lib-
eralisation is determined by a complex process of interde-
pendent relationships, which are difficult to capture in an
econometric or modelling framework. The robustness of
environmental policies and institutions, including the ad-
equacy of supporting regulatory instruments, are impor-
tant determinants of the environmental impacts of trade
and investment liberalisation.224
Thus, the key to addressing any possible sectoral or scale effects
that may arise is ensuring that trading partners have robust domestic en-
vironmental protection regimes. In principle, the environmental policies
included in U.S. trade agreements are intended to do just that. However,
in practice these policies do not contribute much to building institutional
capacity.225 For existing U.S. trade agreements, many of the policies are
“largely aspirational in nature, urging that the environment be protected,
221 Canada completes environmental reviews of its trade agreements which are available
to the public. See, e.g., Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Negotiations: Final Environmental
Assessment Report—January 2016, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CAN. (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www
.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/env/final_ea_canada-ukraine
_ee.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/HDR7-AEXB].
222 Arden-Clarke, supra note 17; OECD, supra note 26, at 12–13.
223 See, e.g., OECD, supra note 26, at 15–17; Nordström & Vaughan, supra note 26, at 39,
46; Cole, supra note 28, at 188, 193; Anderson & Blackhurst, supra note 31, at 4–5; ESTY,
supra note 48, at 21.
224 Colin Kirkpatrick & S. Serban Scrieciu, Is trade liberalisation bad for the environ-
ment? A review of the economic evidence, 51 J. OF ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 497, 506 (2008).
225 See generally Allen, supra note 15.
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but providing few means . . . .”226 Policies for promoting environmental
cooperation are chronically underfunded, duplicative of existing develop-
ment programs, and often times, are not focused on broad-based capacity
building, but rather on targeted cooperative initiatives.227 Overall, the ex-
isting environmental policies in U.S. trade agreements are inadequate
for strengthening institutional capacity, the sine qua non for ensuring
that increased environmental degradation does not occur as a result of
trade liberalization.
In lieu of the current policy approach, a new approach could be
pursued that focuses exclusively on building institutional capacity of trad-
ing partners. In particular, the approach would require completion of a
comprehensive ex ante assessment of the institutional capacity of the U.S.
trading partners to protect the environment, along with the environmen-
tal review required under Executive Order 13141. Based on this capacity
assessment, the United States would determine if assistance is needed
to strengthen the trading partners’ domestic environmental protection
institutions. If assistance is needed, it should be developed completely
outside the context of the trade agreement, and channeled through ex-
isting bilateral and multilateral programs, with oversight by national
level ministries of foreign affairs. Moreover, the assistance should be broad-
based and well-funded, but with a sunset provision228 that will trigger a
review of its effectiveness after a reasonable number of years. For trad-
ing partners that already have robust environmental protection regimes,
no assistance should be provided.
B. Get Rid of the Teeth But Fix the Regulatory Expropriations
Along with the major shift in focus to strengthening the institu-
tional capacity of trading partners to protect the environment, the United
States should eliminate all policies associated with effective enforcement
226 Hymson et al., supra note 102, at 239.
227 See generally Allen, supra note 15 (in countries that already have robust envi-
ronmental management regimes, such as Canada, Australia, and Chile, there is no need
for cooperative initiatives at all. For countries with generally weak environmental pro-
tection regimes, such as the DR-CAFTA countries, institutional capacity building must
be long-term and broad-based with substantial funding for implementation to have any
measurable effect.).
228 A sunset provision or condition within a statute, regulation or other law designates a
certain point in time when that specific law will no longer be in effect unless further leg-
islative action is taken to extend the law. BUSINESS DICTIONARY.COM, Sunset Provision,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/sunset-provision.html [https://perma.cc/L7
S8-FJ28].
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of environmental laws, procedural guarantees, access to remedies, levels
of protection, and the like from its trade agreements. In other words, de-
lete the environment chapters from the trade agreements. Some of these
policies address non-existent problems, and all of them are non-enforce-
able either in principle or in practice. In general, these environmental
policies merely create a green façade for the trade agreements and provide
political cover for legislative approval. As a practical matter, these poli-
cies are unlikely to ever contribute to the creation of the desired domestic
environmental policies, institutions, and traditions because these are
created endogenously, through political processes shaped by the particu-
lar social and economic context. A commitment within a bilateral or re-
gional trade agreement cannot substitute for the weight of history and
long-standing political traditions of a country. The only environmental pol-
icies that should be retained within the trade agreement are those em-
bedded in other chapters and related to the privileging of trade-related
measures within MEAs over trade agreement rules, the right to hear dis-
putes related to sanitary and phytosanitary measures and other stan-
dards-related measures under the dispute resolution processes of the U.S.
trade agreement rather than WTO, and right to use environmental ex-
perts in disputes that involve environmental standards or measures.
Lastly, the expropriation and compensation provision in the investor rights
chapter of trade agreements should be revised to reduce its potential to
be used to challenge environmental laws as regulatory expropriations.
This limited set of policies should serve as the core policies for integra-
tion of environmental policy into future U.S. trade policy.
C. Address Global Environmental Issues Through Other Fora
There is one set of environmental policies that has been included
in the most recent U.S. trade agreement, TPP, and proposed for the re-
negotiation of NAFTA, that presents a unique challenge to rethinking
the policy approach for integrating environmental considerations into U.S.
trade policy. These policies are focused on global environmental prob-
lems, in particular overfishing and illegal trade of wildlife and timber, as
well as fulfillment of obligations under specific MEAs.229 In general,
229 Under TPP, member countries committed in general to implement multilateral agree-
ments to which each trading partner was a party, as well as committed specifically to fulfill
obligations under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, and Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. See TPP, supra note 8.
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these global environmental problems have not been historically associ-
ated with trade liberalization but they have considerable merit and need
urgent attention from the international community. As such, trade agree-
ments provide a new forum for possibly addressing these issues. How-
ever, as was discussed in Part III, there are several drawbacks to including
policies to address these issues within the context of a trade agreement.
Most importantly, including these policies creates a parallel system for
addressing global environmental problems outside of the existing multi-
lateral system and the policies transfer oversight to non-environmental
government agencies, in particular trade agencies, that may not have the
expertise or inclination to ensure effective implementation of the policies.
Assuming for the moment that the United States, Mexico, and
Canada intend to adopt policies to address these global environmental
problems similar to those included in the final TPP environment chapter,
a closer look at these policies within the North American context reveals
that either the policies are not justified or there are other international
fora better suited to pursue policy action. With respect to fulfilling ob-
ligations under certain MEA obligations, such as the Convention on In-
ternational Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the
TPP policies merely reaffirm the countries commitments to the MEAs
and identify opportunities for cooperation that are commonplace. Given
that all three countries have historically fulfilled their obligations under
these MEAs,230 a reaffirmation of their commitment to do so within a trade
agreement would have little value and there exists other international
fora to pursue cooperation.
The environmental policies related to addressing overfishing are
more extensive, and the key policy is focused on reducing subsidies that
contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. Although reducing subsidies
does fall within the trade policy domain, it would be more appropriate to
pursue reduction of these subsidies under the multilateral trading sys-
tem to ensure uniformity at the global level and efforts are currently
underway to improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies.231 Lastly,
230 The environmental review of TPP did not indicate any potential problems in the
United States, Mexico, or Canada for these policy issues. For example, all three countries
are ranked as Category 1, which is “the highest ranking, and indicates that a country has
adequate legislation in place to meet its CITES obligations.” See OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REP., Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 196.
231 See WTO, WTO fisheries negotiations take a step forward with compilation text and
chair’s assessment (Oct. 12 & 13, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fish
_17oct17_e.htm [https://perma.cc/8H5C-MDM8]. Negotiations to improve WTO disciplines
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the TPP policies also set forth some general commitments to strengthen
fisheries management systems and “promote the long-term conservation
of sharks, marine turtles, seabirds, and marine mammals, through the
implementation and effective enforcement of conservation and manage-
ment measures.”232 Along similar lines, it would be more appropriate to
pursue these policies within a new multilateral environmental agree-
ment, or in the near term, through a standalone trilateral environmental
agreement unrelated to the trade agreement.
D. The Way Forward
The debate over the environmental effect of trade liberalization
emerged during the negotiation of NAFTA and it has cast a long shadow
over U.S. trade policy. NAFTA was the first trade agreement to explicitly
link trade policy with environmental protection goals to ensure that lib-
eralized trade did not result in increased environmental degradation and
the environmental policies developed for NAFTA have endured and served
as the template for subsequent U.S. trade agreements. Twenty-five years
on, however, research has shown that the effects of free trade on the en-
vironment are not as drastic or far-reaching as originally thought. Thus,
the inclusion of extensive environmental policies within trade agreements
in general, and NAFTA in particular, is no longer justified. The U.S. trade
policy domain, however, marches on oblivious to these findings and envi-
ronmentalists and policymakers alike continue to advocate for the reten-
tion and strengthening of environmental policies in NAFTA.
This Article provided a long overdue assessment of the arguments
in support of these policies in light of existing research, and overwhelm-
ingly the findings indicate that the majority of environmental policies are
not needed. The dominant environmental concern for NAFTA was the
on fisheries subsidies were launched under the Doha Ministerial, and at the Hong Kong
Ministerial Conference in 2005, member states agreed to pursue a prohibition of certain
forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing. See WTO,
Negotiation on fisheries subsidies, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/fish
_e/fish_e.htm [https://perma.cc/C9T6-D4J5] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018); see also Press
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Obama Administration Undertaking Global Ini-
tiative to Prohibit Harmful Fishing Subsidies (Sept. 2016), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy
-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/september/obama-administration-undertaking
[https://perma.cc/2ZJJ-E2MJ]; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Fisheries
Subsidies: Proposed new Disciplines, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/fisherie-subsidie
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QWG-U26M] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
232 See TPP, supra note 8.
1024 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:965
potential for differing levels of environmental protection in the NAFTA
countries to give rise to pollution havens, dirty industry migration, and
downward harmonization of environmental standards and foster worse
environmental conditions in all countries, but this has not occurred. Other
concerns related to a conflict between trade rules and environmental pol-
icies has similarly not materialized, although as a practical matter, the
inclusion of a small set of environmental policies is justified in case a con-
flict does ever occur.233 More recent concerns related to global environ-
mental issues and MEAs obligations are either not justified or can be better
resolved in other multilateral trade or environmental policy fora or through
a comprehensive program to build institutional capacity of trading part-
ners. Thus, the environmental policies currently included in environment
chapters of U.S. free trade agreements could be eliminated.
Liberalized trade does have the potential to exacerbate unmitigated
market or government failures, and thereby indirectly contribute to envi-
ronmental degradation in a country. However, the sine qua non for ensur-
ing that this environmental degradation does not occur is strengthening
institutional capacity of trading partners to protect the environment. In
general, the U.S. has many long-standing bilateral and multilateral pro-
grams to build institutional capacity of less developed countries, and these
programs can easily be expanded. To identify instances where additional
capacity is needed, the United States should complete a comprehensive ex
ante assessment of the institutional capacity of its trading partners, and
then provide broad-based and long-term assistance to strengthen the capac-
ity. This assessment, along with a small set of core environmental policies
focused on a conflict of rules, should be the focus of the new policy approach
for addressing potential environmental effects of trade liberalization.
233 It would be preferable if the conflict of rules was resolved at the multilateral level, under
the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment. See WTO, The Committee on Trade and
Environment, supra note 169.
